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Abstract
In the standard setting of approachability there are two players and a target set. The
players play repeatedly a known vector-valued game where the first player wants to have
the average vector-valued payoff converge to the target set which the other player tries to
exclude it from this set. We revisit this setting in the spirit of online learning and do not
assume that the first player knows the game structure: she receives an arbitrary vector-
valued reward vector at every round. She wishes to approach the smallest (“best”) possible
set given the observed average payoffs in hindsight. This extension of the standard setting
has implications even when the original target set is not approachable and when it is not
obvious which expansion of it should be approached instead. We show that it is impossible,
in general, to approach the best target set in hindsight and propose achievable though
ambitious alternative goals. We further propose a concrete strategy to approach these goals.
Our method does not require projection onto a target set and amounts to switching between
scalar regret minimization algorithms that are performed in episodes. Applications to global
cost minimization and to approachability under sample path constraints are considered.
Keywords: Approachability, online learning, multi-objective optimization
1. Introduction
The approachability theory of Blackwell (1956) is arguably the most general approach avail-
able so far for online multi-objective optimization and it has received significant attention
recently in the learning community (see, e.g., Abernethy et al., 2011, and the references
therein). In the standard setting of approachability there are two players, a vector-valued
payoff function, and a target set. The players play a repeated vector-valued game where
the first player wants the average vector-valued payoff (representing the states in which the
different objectives are) to converge to the target set (representing the admissible values
for the said states), which the opponent tries to exclude. The target set is prescribed a
priori before the game starts and the aim of the decision-maker is that the average reward
be asymptotically inside the target set.
A theory of approachability in unknown games (i.e., for arbitrary vector-valued
bandit problems). The analysis in approachability has been limited to date to cases where
some underlying structure of the problem is known, namely the vector payoff function r
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(and some signalling structure if the obtained payoffs are not observed). We consider the
case of “unknown games” where only vector-valued rewards are observed and there is no a
priori assumption on what can and cannot be obtained. In particular, we do not assume
that there is some underlying game structure we can exploit. In our model at each round,
for every action of the decision maker there is a vector-valued reward that is only assumed
to be arbitrary. The minimization of regret could be extended to this setting (see, e.g.,
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Sections 7.5 and 7.10). And we know that the minimization
of regret is a special case of approachability. Hence our motivation question: can a theory
of approachability be developed for unknown games?
One might wonder if it is possible to treat an unknown game as a known game with a
very large class of actions and then use approachability. While such lifting is possible in
principle, it would lead to unreasonable time and memory complexity as the dimensionality
of the problem will explode.
In such unknown games, the decision maker does not try to approach a pre-specified
target set, but rather tries to approach the best (smallest) target set given the observed
vector-valued rewards. Defining a goal in terms of the actual rewards is standard in online
learning, but has not been pursued (with a few exceptions listed below) in the multi-
objective optimization community.
A theory of smallest approachable set in insight. Even in known games it may
happen that no pre-specified target set is given, e.g., when the natural target set is not
approachable. Typical relaxations are then to consider uniform expansions of this natural
target set or its convex hull. Can we do better? To answer this question, another property
of regret minimization is our source of inspiration. The definition of a no-regret strategy
(see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) is that its performance is asymptotically as good
as the best constant strategy, i.e., the strategy that selects at each stage the same mixed
action. Another way to formulate this claim is that a no-regret strategy performs (almost)
as well as the best mixed action in hindsight. In the approachability scenario, this question
can be translated into the existence of a strategy that approaches the smallest approachable
set for a mixed action in hindsight. If the answer is negative (and, unfortunately, it is) the
next question is to define a weaker aim that would still be more ambitious than the typical
relaxations considered.
Short literature review. Our approach generalizes several existing works. Our proposed
strategy can be used for standard approachability in all the cases where the desired target
set is not approachable and where one wonders what the aim should be. We illustrate this
on the problems of global costs introduced by Even-Dar et al. (2009) and of approachability
with sample path constraints as described in the special case of regret minimization by
Mannor et al. (2009).
The algorithm we present does not require projection which is the Achilles’ heel of many
approachability-based schemes (it does so similarly to Bernstein and Shimkin, 2015). Our
approach is also strictly more general and more ambitious than one recently considered
by Azar et al. (2014). An extensive comparison to the results by Bernstein and Shimkin
(2015) and Azar et al. (2014) is offered in Section 5.2.
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Outline. This article consists of four parts of about equal lengths. We first define the
problem of approachability in unknown games and link it to the standard setting of ap-
proachability (Section 2).
We then discuss what are the reasonable target sets to consider (Sections 3 and 4).
Section 3 shows by means of two examples that the best-in-hindsight expansion cannot be
achieved while its convexification can be attained but is not ambitious enough. Section 4 in-
troduces a general class of achievable and ambitious enough targets: a sort of convexification
of some individual-response-based target set.
The third part of the paper (Section 5) exhibits concrete and computationally efficient
algorithms to achieve the goals discussed in the first part of the paper. The general strategy
of Section 5 amounts to playing a (standard) regret minimization in blocks and modifying
the direction as needed; its performance and merits are then studied in detail with respect
to the literature mentioned above. It bears some resemblance with the approach developed
by Abernethy et al. (2011).
Last but not least, the fourth part of the paper revisits two important problems, for
which dedicated methods were created and dedicated articles were written: regret minimiza-
tion with global cost functions, and online learning with sample path constraints (Section 6).
We show that our general strategy has stronger performance guarantees in these problems
than the ad hoc strategies that had been constructed by the literature.
2. Setup (“unknown games”), notation, and aim
The setting is the one of (classical) approachability, that is, vector payoffs are considered.
The difference lies in the aim. In (classical) approachability theory, the average rT of the
obtained vector payoffs should converge asymptotically to some target set C, which can be
known to be approachable based on the existence and knowledge of the payoff function r.
In our setting, we do not know whether C is approachable because there is no underlying
payoff function. We then ask for convergence to some α–expansion of C, where α should be
as small as possible.
Setting: unknown game with vectors of vector payoffs. The following game is
repeatedly played between two players, who will be called respectively the decision-maker
(or first player) and the opponent (or second player). Vector payoffs in Rd, where d > 1,
will be considered. The first player has finitely many actions whose set we denote by
A = {1, . . . , A}. We assume A > 2 throughout the paper, to avoid trivialities. The
opponent chooses at each round t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} a vector mt = (mt,a)a∈A of vector payoffs
mt,a ∈ Rd. We impose the restriction that these vectors mt lie in a convex and bounded set
K of (Rd)A. The first player picks at each round t an action at ∈ A, possibly at random
according to some mixed action xt = (xt,a)a∈A; we denote by ∆(A) the set of all such mixed
actions. She then receives mt,at as a vector payoff. We can also assume that mt,at is the
only feedback she gets on mt and that she does not see the other components of mt than
the one she chose. (This is called bandit monitoring but can and will be relaxed to a full
monitoring as we explain below.)
Remark 1 We will not assume that the first player knows K (or any bound on the maximal
norm of its elements); put differently, the scaling of the problem is unknown.
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The terminology of “unknown game” was introduced in the machine learning literature,
see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, Sections 7.5 and 7.11) for a survey. A game is unknown
(to the decision-maker) when she not only does not observe the vector payoffs she would have
received has she chosen a different pure action (bandit monitoring) but also when she does
not even know the underlying structure of the game, if any such structure exists. Section 2.2
will make the latter point clear by explaining how the classical setting of approachability
introduced by Blackwell (1956) is a particular case of the setting described above: some
payoff function r exists therein and the decision-maker knows r. The strategy proposed
by Blackwell (1956) crucially relies on the knowledge of r. In our setting, r is unknown and
even worse, might not even exist. Section 2.3 (and Section A) will recall how a particular
case of approachability known as minimization of the regret could be dealt with for unknown
games.
Formulation of the approachability aim. The decision-maker is interested in control-
ling her average payoff
r˜T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt,at .
She wants it to approach an as small as possible neighborhood of a given target set C, which
we assume to be closed. This concept of neighborhood could be formulated in terms of a
general filtration (see Remark 2 below); for the sake of concreteness we resort rather to
expansions of a base set C in some `p–norm, which we denote by ‖ · ‖, for 0 < p 6 +∞.
Formally, we denote by Cα the closed α–expansion in `p–norm of C:
Cα =
{
c ∈ Rd : ∃ c′ ∈ C s.t. ‖c− c′‖p 6 α
}
=
{
c ∈ Rd : dp(c, C) 6 α
}
.
Here and in the sequel, dp( · , S) denotes the distance in `p–norm to a set S.
As is traditional in the literature of approachability and regret minimization, we consider
the smallest set that would have been approachable in hindsight, that is, had the averages
of the vectors of vector payoffs be known in advance:
mT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
mt , whose components equal ∀ a ∈ A, mT,a = 1
T
T∑
t=1
mt,a .
This notion of “smallest set” is somewhat tricky and the first part of this article will be
devoted to discuss it. The model we will consider is the following one. We fix a target
function ϕ : K → [0,+∞); it takes mT as argument. (Section 4 will indicate reasonable
such choices of ϕ.) It associates with it the ϕ(mT )–expansion of C. Our aim is then to
ensure the almost-sure convergence
dp
(
r˜T , Cϕ(mT )
) −→ 0 as T →∞ .
As in the definition of classic approachability, uniformity will be required with respect to
the strategies of the opponent: the decision-maker should construct strategies such that for
all ε > 0, there exists a time Tε such that for all strategies of the opponent, with probability
at least 1− ε,
sup
T>Tε
dp
(
r˜T , Cϕ(mT )
)
6 ε .
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Remark 2 More general filtrations α ∈ [0,+∞) 7→ Cα could have been considered than
expansions in some norm. By “filtration” we mean that Cα ⊆ Cα′ for all a 6 α′. For
instance, if 0 ∈ C, one could have considered shrinkages and blow-ups, that is, C0 = {0} and
Cα = α C for α > 0. Or, given some compact set B with non-empty interior, Cα = C + αB
for α > 0. But for the sake of clarity and simplicity, we restrict the exposition to the more
concrete case of expansions of a base set C in some `p–norm.
Summary: the two sources of unknowness. As will become clearer in the concrete
examples presented in Section 6, not only the structure of the game is unknown and might
even not exist (first source of unknownness) but also the target is unknown. This second
source arises also in known games, in the following cases: when some natural target (e.g.,
some best-in-hindsight target) is proven to be unachievable or when some feasible target
is not ambitious enough (e.g., the least approachable uniform expansion of C as will be
discussed in Section 5.2.5). What to aim for, then? Convex relaxations are often considered
more manageable and ambitious enough targets; but we will show that they can be improved
upon in general.
See the paragraph “Discussion” on page 26 for more details on these two sources of
unknownness in the concrete example of global costs.
2.1. Two classical relaxations: mixed actions and full monitoring
We present two extremely classical relaxations of the general setting described above. They
come at no cost but simplify the exposition of our general theory.
The decision-maker can play mixed actions. First, because of martingale conver-
gence results, for instance, the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality, controlling r˜T is equivalent to
controlling the averages rT of the conditionally expected payoffs rt, where
rt = xt mt =
∑
a∈A
xt,amt,a and rT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt mt .
Indeed, the boundedness of K and a component-by-component application of the said in-
equality ensure that there exists a constant C such that for all ε > 0, for all T > 1, for all
strategies of the opponent, with probability at least 1− ε,wwr˜T − rTwwp 6 C
√
ln(d/ε)
T
.
Given ε > 0, we use these inequalities each with ε replaced by ε/T 2: a union bound entails
that choosing Tε > 2 sufficiently large so that
sup
T>Tε
C
√
ln(dT 2/ε)
T
6 ε ,
we then have, for all strategies of the opponent, with probability at least 1− ε,
sup
T>Tε
wwr˜T − rTwwp 6 ε . (1)
Therefore, we may focus on rT instead of r˜T in the sequel and consider equivalently the
aim (3) discussed below.
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The decision-maker can enjoy a full monitoring. Second, the bandit-monitoring
assumption can be relaxed to a full monitoring, at least under some regularity assumptions,
e.g., uniform continuity of the target function ϕ.
Indeed, we assumed that the decision-maker only gets to observe mt,at after choosing the
component at ∈ A of mt. However, standard estimation techniques presented by Auer et al.
(2002) and Mertens et al. (1994, Sections V.5.a and VI.6) provide accurate and unbiased
estimators m̂t of the whole vectors mt, at least in the case when the latter only depends on
what happened in the past and on the opponent’s strategy but not on the decision-maker’s
present1 choice of an action at. The components of these estimators m̂t equal, for a ∈ A,
m̂t,a =
mt,a
xt,a
I{a=at} , (2)
with the constraint on mixed actions that xt,a > γt for all t > 1. The decision-maker should
then base her decisions and apply her strategy on m̂t, and eventually choose as a mixed
action the convex combination of the mixed action she would have freely chosen based on
the m̂t, with weight 1− γt, and of the uniform distribution, with weight γt.
Indeed, by the Hoeffding-Azuma inequality, the averages of the vector payoffs and of
the vectors of vector payoffs based respectively on the mt,a and on the m̂t,a, as well as the
corresponding average payoffs obtained by the decision-maker, differ by something of the
order of
1
T

√√√√ T∑
t=1
1
γ2t
+
T∑
t=1
γt
√ln(1/ε)
for each T with probability at least 1 − ε, and uniformly over the opponent’s strategies.
These differences vanish as T → ∞, e.g., at a T−2/3 rate when the γt are of the order of
t−1/3. A treatment similar to the one performed to obtain (1) can also be applied to obtain
statements with uniformities both with respect to time T > Tε and to the strategies of
opponent.
Because our aim involves the average payoffs mT via the target function ϕ as in Cϕ(mT ),
we require the uniform continuity of ϕ for technical reasons, i.e., to carry over the negli-
gible differences between the average payoffs and their estimation in the approachability
aim. (This assumption of uniform continuity can easily be dropped based on the result of
Theorem 11; details are omitted.)
Conclusion: approachability aim. The decision-maker, enjoying a full monitoring,
should construct a strategy such that almost surely and uniformly over the opponent’s
strategies,
dp
(
rT , Cϕ(mT )
) −→ 0 as T →∞ ; (3)
that is, for all ε > 0, there exists Tε > 0 such that for all strategies of the opponent, with
probability at least 1− ε,
sup
T>Tε
dp
(
rT , Cϕ(mT )
)
6 ε .
1. However, such a dependency can still be dealt with in some cases, see, e.g., the case of regret minimization
in Section 2.3 (and Section A): when the dependency on the decision-maker’s present action at comes
only through an additive term equal to the obtained payoff, which is known.
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We note that we will often be able to provide stronger, uniform and deterministic controls,
of the form: there exists a function ζ : {1, 2, 3, . . .} → [0,+∞) such that ζ(T ) → 0 and for
all strategies of the opponent,
dp
(
rT , Cϕ(mT )
)
6 ζ(T ) .
To conclude this section, we point out again that the two relaxations considered come at
no cost in the generality of setting: they are only intended to simplify and clarify the
exposition. Full details of this standard reduction from the case of bandit monitoring to full
monitoring are omitted because they are classical, though lengthy and technical, to expose.
2.2. Link with approachability in known finite games
We link here our general setting above with the classical setting considered by Blackwell
(1956). Therein the decision-maker and the opponent have finite sets of actions A and B,
and choose at each round t respective pure actions at ∈ A and bt ∈ B, possibly at random
according to some mixed actions xt = (xt,a)a∈A ∈ ∆(A) and yt = (yt,b)b∈B ∈ ∆(B). A
payoff function r : A × B → Rd is given and is multilinearly extended to ∆(A) × ∆(B)
according to
∀ (x, y) ∈ ∆(A)×∆(B), r(x, y) =
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈B
xa yb r(a, b) .
From the decision-maker viewpoint, the game takes place as if the opponent was choosing
at each round the vector of vector payoffs
mt = r( · , bt) =
(
r(a, bt)
)
a∈A .
A target set C is to be approached, that is, the convergence
r˜T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
r(at, bt) −→ C a.s.
should hold uniformly over the opponent’s strategies. (Of course, as recalled above, we can
equivalently require the uniform convergence of rT to C.)
A necessary and sufficient condition for this when C is closed and convex is that for all
y ∈ ∆(B), there exists some x ∈ ∆(A) such that r(x, y) ∈ C. Of course, this condition,
called the dual condition for approachability, is not always met. However, in view of the
dual condition, the least approachable α–expansion in `p–norm of such a non-empty, closed,
and convex set C is given by
αunif = max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
dp
(
r(x, y), C) . (4)
Approaching Cαunif corresponds to considering the constant target function ϕ ≡ αunif in (3).
Better (uniformly smaller) choices of target functions exist, as will be discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2.5. This will be put in correspondence therein with what is called “opportunistic
approachability.”
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The knowledge of r is crucial (a first strategy). The general strategies used to
approach C (or Cαunif when C is not approachable and p = 2) rely crucially on the knowledge
of r.
Indeed, the original strategy of Blackwell (1956) proceeds as follows: at round t+ 1, it
first computes the projection c˜t of r˜t onto C. Then it picks at+1 at random according to a
mixed action xt+1 such that
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), 〈r˜t − c˜t, r(xt+1, y)− c˜t〉 6 0 . (5)
When C is approachable, such a mixed action always exists; one can take, for instance,
xt+1 ∈ arg min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈
r˜t − c˜t, r(x, y)
〉
.
In general, the strategy thus heavily depends on the knowledge of r.
When C is not approachable and p = 2, the set Cαunif is the target and the choice right
above is still suitable to approach Cαunif in `2–norm. Indeed, the projection d˜t of r˜t onto
Cαunif is such that r˜t − d˜t is proportional to r˜t − c˜t, thus
arg min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈
r˜t − c˜t, r(x, y)
〉
= arg min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈
r˜t − d˜t, r(x, y)
〉
.
The knowledge of r is crucial (a second strategy). There are other strategies to
perform approachability in known finite games, though the one described above may be the
most popular one. For instance, Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) propose a strategy based on
the dual condition for approachability, which still performs approachability at the optimal
1/
√
T rate. We discuss it in greater details and generalize it to the case of unknown games
in Section 5.2. For now, we describe it shortly only to show how heavily it relies on the game
r being known. Assume that C is approachable. At round t = 1, choose an arbitrary mixed
action x1 to draw a1 and choose an arbitrary mixed action y˜1 ∈ B. For rounds t+1, assume
that mixed actions y˜1, . . . , y˜t ∈ ∆(B) have been chosen by the decision-maker in addition to
the pure actions b1, . . . , bt actually played by the opponent, and that corresponding mixed
actions x˜1, . . . , x˜t such that r
(
x˜s, y˜s
) ∈ C have been chosen as well. Denoting
δt =
t∑
τ=1
r(aτ , bτ )−
t∑
τ=1
r
(
x˜τ , y˜τ
)
,
the strategy selects
xt+1 ∈ arg min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
〈δt, r(x, y)〉 and y˜t+1 ∈ arg max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
〈δt, r(x, y)〉 ,
as well as x˜t+1 ∈ ∆(A) such that r
(
x˜t+1, y˜t+1
) ∈ C, where such an x˜t+1 exists since C is
approachable. Thus, it is crucial that the strategy knows r; however, that C be approachable
is not essential: in case it is not approachable and Cαunif is to be approached instead, it
suffices to pick
x˜s ∈ arg min
x∈∆(A)
dp
(
r
(
x, y˜s
)
, C
)
,
so that r
(
x˜s, y˜s
) ∈ Cαunif . Any `p–norm is suitable for this argument.
8
Approachability in Unknown Games
2.3. Link with regret minimization in unknown games
The problem of regret minimization can be encompassed as an instance of approachability.
For the sake of completeness, we recall in Appendix A why the knowledge of the payoff
structure is not crucial for this very specific problem. This, of course, is not the case at all
for general approachability problems.
3. Two toy examples to develop some intuition
The examples presented below will serve as guides to determine suitable target functions
ϕ : K → [0,+∞), that is, target functions for which the convergence (3) can be guaranteed
and that are ambitious (small) enough, in a sense that will be made formal in the next
section.
Example 1: minimize several costs at a time. The following example is a toy mod-
eling of a case when the first player has to perform several tasks simultaneously and incurs
a loss (or a cost) for each of them; we assume that her overall loss is the worst (the largest)
of the losses thus suffered.
For simplicity, and because it will be enough for our purpose, we will assume that the
decision-maker only has two actions, that is, A = {1, 2}, while the opponent is restricted to
only pick convex combinations of the following vectors of vector payoffs:
m† =
(
m†a
)
a∈{1,2} ∈ R2×2 with m
†
1 =
[
3
4
]
and m†2 =
[
0
5
]
,
and m] =
(
m]a
)
a∈{1,2} ∈ R2×2 with m
]
1 =
[
4
3
]
and m]2 =
[
5
0
]
.
The opponent’s actions can thus be indexed by ν ∈ [0, 1], where the latter corresponds to
the vector of vectors
m(ν) = νm† + (1− ν)m] ∈ R2×2 .
The base target set C is the negative orthant C = (−∞, 0]2 and its α–expansions in
the supremum norm (p = +∞) are Cα = (−∞, α]2. A graphical representation of these
expansions and of the vectors m† and m] is provided in Figure 1.
Example 2: control absolute values. In this example, the decision-maker still has only
two actions, A = {1, 2}, and gets scalar rewards, i.e., d = 1. The aim is to minimize the
absolute value of the average payoff, i.e., to control the latter from above and from below
(for instance, because these payoffs measure deviations in either direction from a desired
situation).
Formally, the opponent chooses vectors mt ∈ R2, which we assume to actually lie in
K = [−1, 1]2. The product  is then simply the standard inner product over R2. We
consider C = {0} as a base target set to be approached. Its expansions (in any `p–norm)
are C = [−α, α], for α > 0.
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We then compute ϕ? using (4):
ϕ?(ν) = min
x∈[0,1]
αx(ν) = min
{
α0(ν), α1(ν)
}
=

4− ν if ν ∈ [0, 1/4],
5− 5ν if ν ∈ [1/4, 1/2],
5ν if ν ∈ [1/2, 3/4],
3 + ν if ν ∈ [3/4, 1].
This last set of equalities can be seen to hold true by contemplating Figure 2.
C C2.5 C4
m†
m]
2.5
4
5
ϕ?
m†m]
αx
Figure 2: Graphical representation of m† and m], and of different expansions Cα (left); graphs
of the functions ϕ? (bold solid line), of α0 and α1 (dotted lines), and of some αx, for
x ∈ [0, 1] (thin solid line).
Proof [of Lemma 4] Assume by contradiction that ϕ? is achievable in the above example and
consider any strategy of the decision maker to do so, which we denote by σ. Imagine in a first time
that Nature chooses, at every stage t > 1, the vectors mt = m†, which amounts to playing νt = 1.
Given that the average of the νt equals νT = 1 and that its image by ϕ? equals ϕ?(1) = 4, the aim
is then to converge to C4. But this can only be guaranteed if the average of the chosen xt converges
to 1. That is, given ε > 0, there exists some, possibly large, integer Tε such that∥∥∥∥rTε − [ 34
]∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ε . (21)
Now, consider a second scenario. During the first Tε stages, Nature chooses the vectors mt = m†.
By construction, as σ is fixed, (21) is ensured. Now, for the next Tε stages, for Tε + 1 6 t 6 2Tε,
assume that Nature chooses the vectors mt = m], and denote by γ ∈ [0, 1] the average of the
xt ∈ [0, 1] selected by σ. The average of the played vectors is m2Tε corresponds to ν = 1/2, whose
image by ϕ? equals ϕ?(1/2) = 5/2. Therefore the target set is C2.5. However, by definition of γ,
we have
r2Tε =
1
2
rTε +
1
2
2Tε∑
t=Tε+1
xt m] = 1
2
rTε +
1
2
(
γ
[
4
3
]
+ (1− γ)
[
5
0
])
=
1
2
rTε +
1
2
([
5− γ
3γ
])
,
23
Figure 1: Graphical representation of m† and m] and of different expansions Cα.
3.1. The smallest set in hindsight cannot be achieved in general
We denote by ϕ? : K → [0,+∞) the function that associates with a vector of vector payoffs
m ∈ K the index of the smallest `p–expansion of C containing a convex combination of its
components:
ϕ?(m) = min
{
α > 0 : ∃x ∈ ∆(A) s. . xm ∈ Cα
}
min
x∈∆(A)
dp(xm, C) , (6)
the infimum being achieved by continuity. This defines a function x?:
∀m ∈ K, ∃x?(m) ∈ ∆(A) : x?(m)m ∈ Cϕ?(m) .
Lemma 3 In Examples 1 and 2, the convergence (3) cannot be achieved for ϕ? against all
strategies of the opponent.
The proofs (located in Appendix B.1) reveal that the difficulty in (3) is that it should
hold along a whole path, while the value of ϕ?
(
mT
)
can change more rapidly than the
average payoff vectors rT do.
They will formalize the following proof scheme. To accommodate a first situation, which
lasts a large number T ′ of stages, the decision-maker should play in a given way; but then,
the opponent changes drastically his strategy and from where the decision-maker is she
cannot catch up and is far from the target at stage 2T ′. The situation is repeated.
3.2. A concave relaxation is not ambitious enough
A classical relaxation in the game-theory literature for unachievable targets (see, e.g., how
Mannor et al., 2009 proceed) is to consider concavifications. Can the convergence (3) hold
with ϕ = cav[ϕ?], the concavification of ϕ?? The latter is defined as the least concave
function K → [0,+∞] above ϕ?. The next section will show that it is indeed always the
case but we illustrate on our examples why such a goal is not ambitious enough. (The proof
of the lemma below can be found in Appendix B.2.)
Lemma 4 In Examples 1 and 2, the decision-maker has a mixed action (x, 1 − x) that
she can play at each round to ensure the convergence (3) for a target function ϕx that is
uniformly smaller than ϕ?, and even strictly smaller at some points.
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4. A general class of ambitious enough target functions
The previous section showed on examples that the best-in-hindsight target function ϕ? was
too ambitious a goal while its concavification cav[ϕ?] seemed not ambitious enough. In this
section, based on the intuition given by the formula for concavification, we provide a whole
class of achievable target functions, relying on a parameter: a response function Ψ.
In the definition below, by uniformity over strategies of the opponent player, we mean
the uniform convergence stated right after (3). We denote by Gϕ the graph of the set-valued
mapping m ∈ K 7→ Cϕ(m):
Gϕ =
{
(m, r) ∈ K × Rd s.t. r ∈ Cϕ(m)
}
⊂ (Rd)A × Rd .
Definition 5 A continuous target function ϕ : K → [0,+∞) is achievable if the decision-
maker has a strategy ensuring that, uniformly over all strategies of the opponent player,
dp
(
rT , Cϕ(mT )
) −→ 0 as T →∞ . (7)
More generally, a (possibly non-continuous) target function ϕ : K → [0,+∞) is achievable
if Gϕ is approachable for the game with payoff function (x,m) ∈ ∆(A)×K 7→ (m, xm),
that is, if uniformly over all strategies of the opponent player,
(mT , rT ) −→ Gϕ as T →∞ . (8)
We always have that (7) entails (8), with or without continuity of ϕ. The condition (8)
is however less restrictive in general and it is useful in the case of non-continuous target
functions (e.g., to avoid lack of convergence due to errors at early stages). But for continuous
target functions ϕ, the two definitions (7) and (8) are equivalent. We prove these two facts
in Section C.1 in the appendix.
The defining equalities (6) for ϕ? show that this function is continuous (it is even a
Lipschitz function with constant 1 in the `p–norm). We already showed in Section 3.1 that
the target function ϕ? is not achievable in general.
To be able to compare target functions, we consider the following definition and notation.
Definition 6 A target function ϕ : K → [0,+∞) is strictly smaller than another target
function ϕ′ if ϕ 6 ϕ′ and there exists m ∈ K with ϕ(m) < ϕ′(m). We denote this fact by
ϕ ≺ ϕ′.
For instance, in Lemma 4, we had ϕx ≺ ϕ?.
4.1. The target function cav[ϕ?] is always achievable
We show below that the target function cav[ϕ?] is always achievable... But of course,
Section 3.2 already showed that cav[ϕ?] is not ambitious enough: in Examples 1 and 2,
there exist easy-to-construct achievable target functions ϕ with ϕ ≺ cav[ϕ?]. We however
provide here a general study of the achievability of cav[ϕ?] as it sheds light on how to achieve
more ambitious target functions.
So, we now only ask for convergence of (mT , rT ) to the convex hull of Gϕ? , not to
Gϕ? itself. Indeed, this convex hull is exactly the graph Gcav[ϕ?], where cav[ϕ?] is the
11
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concavification of ϕ?, defined as the least concave function K → [0,+∞] above ϕ?. Its
variational expression reads
cav[ϕ?](m) = sup
∑
i6N
λi ϕ
?(mi) : N > 1 and
∑
i6N
λimi = m
 , (9)
for all m ∈ K, where the supremum is over all finite convex decompositions of m as elements
of K (i.e., the mi belong to K and the λi factors are nonnegative and sum up to 1). By a
theorem of Fenchel and Bunt (see Hiriart-Urruty and Lemare´chal, 2001, Theorem 1.3.7) we
could actually further impose that 1 6 N 6 dA+ 1. In general, cav[ϕ?] is not continuous;
it is however so when, e.g., K is a polytope.
Lemma 7 The target function cav[ϕ?] is always achievable.
Proof sketch; when K is known When the decision-maker knows K (and only in this
case), she can compute cav[ϕ?] and its graph Gcav[ϕ?]. As indicated after Definition 5,
it suffices to show that the convex set Gcav[ϕ?] is approachable for the game with payoffs
(x,m) ∈ ∆(A) × K 7→ (m, x m); the decision-maker should then play any strategy ap-
proaching Gcav[ϕ?]. Note that ϕ? is continuous, that Gϕ? is thus a closed set, and that
Gcav[ϕ?] is a closed convex set containing Gϕ? . Now, the characterization of approachability
by Blackwell (1956) for closed convex sets (recalled already in Section 2.2) states that for
all m ∈ K, there should exist x ∈ ∆(A) such that (m, x  m) ∈ Gcav[ϕ?]. But by the
definition (6), we even have
(
m, x?(m)m) ∈ Gϕ? , which concludes the proof.
We only proved Lemma 7 under the assumption that the decision-maker knows K, a
restriction which we are however not ready to consider as indicated in Remark 1. Indeed,
she needs to know K to compute Gϕ? and the needed projections onto this set to implement
Blackwell’s approachability strategy. Some other approachability strategies may not require
this knowledge, e.g., a generalized version of the one of Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) based
on the dual condition for approachability (see Section 2.2 for their original version, see
Section 5.2.4 for our generalization).
But anyway, we chose not to go into these details now because at least in the case
when C is convex, Lemma 7 will anyway follow from Lemmas 8 and 10 (or Theorem 11)
below, which are proved independently and wherein no knowledge of K is assumed2. Even
better, they prove the strongest notion of convergence (7) of Definition 5, irrespectively of
the continuity or lack of continuity of cav[ϕ?].
4.2. An example of a more ambitious target function
By (6) we can rewrite (9) as
cav[ϕ?](m) = sup
∑
i6N
λi dp
(
x?(mi)mi, C
)
: N > 1 and
∑
i6N
λimi = m
 .
2. Indeed, the functions x? and ϕ? at hand therein are independent of K as they are defined for each m ∈ K
as the solutions of some optimization program that only depends on this specific m and on C, but not
on K.
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Now, whenever C is convex, the function dp( · , C
)
is convex as well over Rd; see, e.g., Boyd
and Vandenberghe (2004, Example 3.16). Therefore, denoting by ϕx
?
the function defined
as
ϕx
?
(m) = sup
dp
(∑
i6N
λi x
?(mi)mi, C
)
: N > 1 and
∑
i6N
λimi = m
 (10)
for all m ∈ K, we have ϕx? 6 cav[ϕ?]. The two examples considered in Section 3.2 actually
show that this inequality can be strict at some points. We summarize these facts in the
lemma below, whose proof can be found in Appendix B.3. That ϕx
?
is achievable is a special
case of Lemma 10 stated in the next subsection, where a class generalizing the form of ϕx
?
will be discussed.
Lemma 8 The inequality ϕx
? 6 cav[ϕ?] always holds when C is convex. For Examples 1
and 2, we even have ϕx
? ≺ cav[ϕ?].
4.3. A general class of achievable target functions
The class is formulated by generalizing the definition (10): we call response function any
function Ψ : K → ∆(A) and we replace in (10) the specific response function x? by any
response function Ψ.
Definition 9 The target function ϕΨ based on the response function Ψ is defined, for all
m ∈ K, as
ϕΨ(m) = sup
dp
∑
i6N
λi Ψ(mi)mi, C
 : N > 1 and ∑
i6N
λimi = m
 . (11)
Lemma 10 For all response functions Ψ, the target functions ϕΨ are achievable.
The lemma actually follows from Theorem 11 below, which provides an explicit and ef-
ficient strategy to achieve any ϕΨ, in the stronger sense (7) irrespectively of the continuity
or lack of continuity of ϕΨ. For now, we provide a sketch of proof (under an additional
assumption of Lipschitzness for Ψ) based on calibration, because it further explains the
intuition behind (11). It also advocates why the ϕΨ functions are reasonable targets: re-
sorting to some auxiliary calibrated strategy outputting accurate predictions mˆt (in the
sense of calibration) of the vectors mt almost amounts to knowing in advance the mt. And
with such a knowledge, what can we get?
Proof sketch; when Ψ is a Lipschitz function We will show below that there exists
a constant L′ ensuring the following: given any δ > 0, there exists randomized strategy of
the decision-maker such that for all ε > 0, there exists a time Tε such that for all strategies
of the opponent, with probability at least 1− ε,
sup
T>Tε
dp
(
rT , CϕΨ(mT )
)
6 L′(δ + ε) a.s. (12)
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In terms of approachability theory (see, e.g., Perchet, 2014 for a survey), this means that
GϕΨ is in particular an L′δ–approachable set for all δ > 0, thus a 0–approachable set. But 0–
approachability and approachability are two equivalents notions (a not-so-trivial fact when
the sets at hand are not closed convex sets). That is, GϕΨ is approachable, or put differently,
ϕΨ is achievable.
Indeed, fixing δ > 0, there exists a randomized strategy picking predictions m̂t among
finitely many elements m[j] ∈ K, where j ∈ {1, . . . , Nδ} so that the so-called calibration
score is controlled: for all ε > 0, there exists a time Tε such that for all strategies of the
opponent, with probability at least 1− ε,
sup
T>Tε
Nδ∑
j=1
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{
m̂t=m[j]
}(m̂t −mt)
wwwww
p
6 δ + ε a.s.; (13)
see3 Foster and Vohra (1998). Now, the main strategy, based on such an auxiliary calibrated
strategy, is to play Ψ(m̂t) at each round. The average payoff of the decision-maker is thus
rT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ψ
(
m̂t
)mt .
We decompose it depending on the predictions m̂t made: for each j ∈ {1, . . . , Nδ}, the av-
erage number of times m[j] was predicted and the average vectors of vector payoffs obtained
on the corresponding rounds equal
λ̂j,T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{
m̂t=m[j]
} and m̂j,T =
∑T
t=1mt I{m̂t=m[j]}∑T
t=1 I{m̂t=m[j]}
whenever λ̂j,T > 0, otherwise, we take an arbitrary value for m̂
j,T
. In particular,
mT =
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T m̂
j,T
and rT =
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T Ψ
(
m[j]
) m̂j,T .
Using this convex decomposition of mT in terms of elements of K, the very definition of ϕΨ
leads to
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T Ψ
(
m̂
j,T
)
 m̂j,T ∈ CϕΨ(mT ) ,
3. Actually, the latter reference only considers the case of calibrated predictions of elements in some simplex,
but it is clear from the method used in Mannor and Stoltz (2010) — a reduction to a problem of
approachability — that this can be performed for all subsets of compact sets, such as K here, with the
desired uniformity over the opponent’s strategies; see also Mannor et al. (2014, Appendix B). The result
holds for any `p–norm by equivalence of norms on vector spaces of finite dimension, even if the original
references considered the `1 or `2–norms only.
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hence
dp
(
rT , CϕΨ(mT )
)
6
wwwwwwrT −
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T Ψ
(
m̂
j,T
)
 m̂j,T
wwwwww
p
=
wwwwww
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T
(
Ψ
(
m[j]
)−Ψ(m̂j,T)) m̂j,T
wwwwww
p
.
We denote by Bp,max a bound on the maximal `p–norm of an element in the bounded set
K. A triangular equality shows thatwwwwww
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T
(
Ψ
(
m[j]
)−Ψ(m̂j,T)) m̂j,T
wwwwww
p
6
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣Ψ(m[j])a −Ψ(m̂j,T)a
∣∣∣∣ wwwm̂j,Ta wwwp
6 Bp,max
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣Ψ(m[j])a −Ψ(m̂j,T)a
∣∣∣∣
where ψ(m)a refers to the probability mass put on a ∈ A by ψ(m). As indicated above,
we assume for this sketch of proof that Ψ is a Lipschitz function, with Lipschitz constant L
with respect to the `1–norm over ∆(A) and the `p–norm over K. We get
Bp,max
Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣Ψ(m[j])a −Ψ(m̂j,T)a
∣∣∣∣ 6 Bp,max L Nδ∑
j=1
λ̂j,T
wwwm[j] − m̂j,Twww
p
= Bp,max L
Nδ∑
j=1
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{
m̂t=m[j]
}(m̂t −mt)
wwwww
p
.
Substituting (13), we proved (12) for L′ = Bp,max L, which concludes the proof.
4.4. Some thoughts on the optimality of target functions
The previous subsections showed that target functions of the form ϕΨ were achievable,
unlike the best-in-hindsight target function ϕ?, and that they were more ambitious than
the concavification cav[ϕ?]. The question of their optimality can be raised — a question to
which we will not be able to answer in general. Our thoughts are gathered in Appendix D.
5. A strategy by regret minimization in blocks
In this section we exhibit a strategy to achieve the stronger notion of convergence (7) with
the target functions ϕΨ advocated in Section 4.3, irrespectively of the continuity or lack of
continuity of ϕΨ. The algorithm is efficient, as long as calls to Ψ are (a full discussion of
the complexity issues will be provided for each application studied in Section 6).
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5.1. Description and analysis of the strategy
As in Abernethy et al. (2011), the considered strategy — see Figure 2 — relies on some
auxiliary regret-minimizing strategy R, namely, a strategy with the following property.
Assumption 1 The strategy R sequentially outputs mixed actions ut ∈ ∆(A) such that
for all ranges B > 0 (not necessarily known in advance), for all T > 1 (not necessarily
known in advance), for all sequences of vectors m′t ∈ RA of one-dimensional payoffs lying
in the bounded interval [−B,B], possibly chosen online by some opponent player, where
t = 1, . . . , T ,
max
u∈∆(A)
T∑
t=1
um′t 6 4B
√
T lnA+
T∑
t=1
ut m′t .
Note in particular that the auxiliary strategy R automatically adapts to the range B of
the payoffs and to the number of rounds T , and has a sublinear worst-case guarantee. (The
adaptation to B will be needed because K is unknown.) Such auxiliary strategies indeed
exist, for instance, the polynomially weighted average forecaster of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
(2003). Other ones with a possibly larger constant factor in front of the B
√
T lnA term also
exist, for instance, exponentially weighted average strategies with learning rates carefully
tuned over time, as described by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2007) or de Rooij et al. (2014).
For the sake of elegance (but maybe at the cost of not providing all the intuitions that
led us to this result), we only provide in Figure 2 the time-adaptive version of our strategy,
which does not need to know the time horizon T in advance. The used blocks are of
increasing lengths 1, 2, 3, . . .. Simpler versions with fixed block length L would require a
tuning of L in terms of T (pick L of the order of
√
T ) to optimize the theoretical bound.
Theorem 11 For all response functions Ψ, the strategy of Figure 2 is such that for all
T > 1, for all strategies of the opponent, there exists cT ∈ CϕΨ(mT ) ensuringwwrT − cTww2 6 10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2 , (14)
where B2,max = max
m∈K
‖m‖2 is the maximal Euclidean norm of elements in K.
In particular, denoting by κp a constant such that ‖ · ‖p 6 κp ‖ · ‖2, for all T > 1 and
all strategies of the opponent,
dp
(
rT , CϕΨ(mT )
)
6 κp
(
10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2
)
. (15)
Remark 12 With the notation of Figure 2, denoting in addition by nT the largest integer
such that nT (nT + 1)/2 6 T , by
mpart. =
1
T − nT (nT + 1)/2
T∑
t=nT (nT+1)/2+1
mt
the partial average of the vectors of vector payoffs mt obtained during the last and (nT+1)–th
block when nT (nT + 1)/2 < T (and an arbitrary element of K otherwise), we can take
cT =
1
T
(
nT∑
k=1
kΨ
(
m(k)
)m(k) + (T − nT (nT + 1)
2
)
Ψ
(
mpart.
)mpart.) . (16)
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Parameters: a regret-minimizing strategy R (with initial action u1) and a response function
Ψ : K → ∆(A)
Initialization: play x1 = u1 and observe m1 ∈ (Rd)A; this is block n = 1
For blocks n = 2, 3 . . .,
1. compute the total discrepancy δn at the beginning
a of block n (that is, till the end of
block n− 1),
δn =
n(n−1)/2∑
t=1
xt mt −
n−1∑
k=1
kΨ
(
m(k)
)m(k) ∈ Rd ,
where m(k) =
1
k
k∑
t=1
mk(k−1)/2+t
is the average vector of vector payoffs obtained in block k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1};
2. run a fresh instance Rn of R for n rounds as follows: set un,1 = u1; then, for t = 1, . . . , n,
(a) play xn(n−1)/2+t = un,t and observe mn(n−1)/2+t ∈ (Rd)A;
(b) feed Rn with the vector payoff m′n,t ∈ RA with components given, for a ∈ A, by
m′n,t,a = −〈δn, mn(n−1)/2+t,a〉 ∈ R,
where 〈 · , · 〉 denotes the inner product in Rd;
(c) obtain from Rn a mixed action un,t+1.
a. Block n starts at round 1 +
n(n− 1)
2
, is of length n, thus lasts till round
n(n + 1)
2
.
Figure 2: The proposed strategy, which plays in blocks of increasing lengths 1, 2, 3, . . .
Important comments on the result. The strategy itself does not rely on the knowledge
of K, as promised in Remark 1; only its performance bound does, via the B2,max term. Also,
the convexity of C is not required. The convergence rates are independent of the ambient
dimension d.
Concerning the norms, even if the strategy and its bound (14) are based on the Euclidean
norm, the set CϕΨ(mT ) is defined in terms of the `p–norm as in (11). The constant κp exists
by equivalence of the norms on a finite-dimensional space.
Finally, we note that we obtained the uniformity requirement stated after (3) in the
deterministic form with a function ζ where ζ(T ) = O
(
T−1/4
)
.
Proof The convergence (15) follows from the bound (14) via the equivalence between `p–
and `2–norms. That the stated cT in (16) belongs to CϕΨ(mT ), where the latter set is defined
in terms of the `p–norm as in (11), is by construction of ϕ
Ψ as a supremum. It thus suffices
to prove (14) with the cT defined in (16), which we do by induction.
The induction is on the index n > 1 of the blocks, and the quantities to control are the
squared Euclidean norms of the discrepancies at the end of these blocks, ‖δn+1‖22. (We recall
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that δn+1 denotes the discrepancy at the end of block n.) We have that δ2 is a difference
between two elements of K, thus that ‖δ2‖22 6 4B22,max.
We use a self-confident approach: we consider a function β : {1, 2, . . .} → [0,+∞) to be
defined by the analysis and assume that we have proved that our strategy is such that for
some n > 1 and for all sequences of vectors of vector payoffs mt ∈ K, possibly chosen by
some opponent (i.e., for all strategies of the opponent),
‖δn+1‖22 =
wwwwww
n(n+1)/2∑
t=1
xt mt −
n∑
k=1
kΨ
(
m(k)
)m(k)
wwwwww
2
2
6 β(n) .
For instance, we define β(1) = 4B22,max.
We then study what we can guarantee for n+ 2. We have
‖δn+2‖22 =
wwwwwwδn+1 +
 (n+1)(n+2)/2∑
t=n(n+1)/2+1
xt mt − (n+ 1) Ψ
(
m(n+1)
)m(n+1)
wwwwww
2
2
= ‖δn+1‖22 + 2
〈
δn+1,
(n+1)(n+2)/2∑
t=n(n+1)/2+1
xt mt − (n+ 1) Ψ
(
m(n+1)
)m(n+1)〉
+
wwwwww
(n+1)(n+2)/2∑
t=n(n+1)/2+1
xt mt − (n+ 1) Ψ
(
m(n+1)
)m(n+1)
wwwwww
2
2
. (17)
We upper bound the two squared norms by β(n) and 4(n+ 1)2B22,max, respectively. Using
the short-hand notation u(n+1) = Ψ
(
m(n+1)
)
, the inner product can be rewritten, with the
notation of Figure 2, as〈
δn+1,
(n+1)(n+2)/2∑
t=n(n+1)/2+1
xt mt − (n+ 1) Ψ
(
m(n+1)
)m(n+1)〉
= −
n+1∑
t=1
un+1,t m′n+1,t +
n+1∑
t=1
u(n+1) m′n+1,t (18)
Now, the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality indicates that for all a and t,∣∣m′n+1,t,a∣∣ 6 ‖δn+1‖2 ‖mn(n+1)/2+t,a‖2 6 B2,max√β(n) ,
where we used again the induction hypothesis. Assumption 1 therefore indicates that the
quantity (18) can be bounded by 4B2,max
√
β(n)
√
(n+ 1) lnA.
Putting everything together, we have proved that the induction holds provided that
β(n+ 1) is defined, for instance, as
β(n+ 1) = β(n) + 8B2,max
√
β(n)
√
(n+ 1) lnA+ 4B22,max(n+ 1)
2 .
By the lemma in Appendix C.2 (taking γ1 = 4B2,max
√
lnA and γ2 = 4B
2
2,max), we thus get
first
∀n > 1, β(n) 6 32B22,max(lnA)n3 , then ∀n > 1, ‖δn+1‖2 6 B2,max
√
32n3 lnA .
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It only remains to relate the quantity at hand in (14) and (16) to the δn+1. By separating
time till the end of the nT –block and starting from the beginning of block nT + 1 (should
the latter start strictly before T ), we get
rT − cT = 1
T
T∑
t=1
xt mt − 1
T
(
nT∑
k=1
kΨ
(
m(k)
)m(k) + (T − nT (nT + 1)
2
)
Ψ
(
mpart.
)mpart.)
=
1
T
δnT+1 +
1
T
T∑
t=nT (nT+1)/2+1
(
xt −Ψ
(
mpart.
))mt .
The second sum contains at most nT elements, as the (nT + 1)-th regime is incomplete. A
triangular inequality thus shows that
‖rT − cT ‖2 6 1
T
‖δnT+1‖2 + 2B2,max
nT
T
6 1
T
B2,max
√
32n3T lnA+ 2B2,max
nT
T
6 10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2 ,
where we used the inequality nT (nT + 1)/2 6 T , its implication nT 6
√
2T , as well as (for
the sake of readability) the bounds
√
32× 23/2 < 10 and 2√2 < 3.
5.2. Discussion
In this section we gather comments, remarks, and pointers to the literature. We discuss
in particular the links and improvements over the concurrent (and independent) works
by Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) and Azar et al. (2014).
5.2.1. Do we have to play in blocks? Is the obtained T−1/4 rate optimal?
Our strategy proceeds in blocks, unlike the ones exhibited for the case of known games, as
the original strategy by Blackwell (1956) or the more recent one by Bernstein and Shimkin
(2015), see Section 2.2. The calibration-based strategy considered in the proof of Lemma 10
also performed some grouping, according to the finitely many possible values of the predicted
vectors of vector payoffs. This is because the target set to approach is unknown: the
decision-maker approaches a sequence of expansions of this set, where the sizes ϕΨ(mT ) of
the expansions vary depending on the sequence of realized averages mT of vectors of vector
payoffs. When an approachable target set C is given, the strategies, e.g., by Blackwell (1956)
or Bernstein and Shimkin (2015), do not need to perform any grouping.
Actually, it is easy to prove that the following quantity, which involves no grouping in
rounds, cannot be minimized in general:
‖rT − c′T ‖p =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
xt mt − 1
T
T∑
t=1
Ψ(mt)mt
∥∥∥∥∥
p
(19)
where c′T =
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ψ(mt)mt . (20)
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Indeed, consider a toy case where the mt = (gt,a)a∈A have scalar components gt,a ∈ R,
the negative orthant C = (−∞, 0] is to be approached, whose expansions are given by
Cα = (−∞, α], for α > 0. Considering the response function Ψ
(
(ga)a∈A
) ∈ arg maxa∈A ga,
we see that (19) boils down to controlling∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
xt,agt,a − 1
T
T∑
t=1
max
a′t∈A
ga′t,t
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which is impossible4. This is in contrast with the regret (38), which can be minimized.
The most severe issue here is not really the absolute value taken, but the fact that we
are comparing the decision-maker’s payoff to the sum of the instantaneous maxima of the
payoffs ga,t, instead of being interesting in the maximum of their sums as in (38).
So, the answer to the first question would be: yes, we have to play in blocks. Given
that, is the obtained T−1/4 rate optimal? We can answer this question in the positive
by considering the same toy case as above. With this example, the bound (14) given the
definition (16) of cT rewrites∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
xt,agt,a − 1
T
 nT∑
k=1
max
a′k∈A
k(k+1)/2∑
t=k(k−1)/2+1
gt,a′k + maxa′nT+1∈A
T∑
t=nT (nT−1)/2+1
gt,a′k
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
which corresponds to the control (from above and from below) of what is called a (per-round)
“tracking regret” for nT shifts. This notion was introduced by Helmbold and M.Warmuth
(1998); see also Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006, Chapter 5) for a review of the results known
for tracking regret. In particular, the examples used therein to show the optimality of the
bounds (which are of the form of the one considered in Footnote 4) can be adapted in our
context, so that the lower bound on tracking regret with nT shifts applies in our case: it is
of the order of
√
nT /T , thus of T
−1/4.
In a nutshell, what we proved in these paragraphs is that if we are to ensure the con-
vergence (3) by controlling a quantity of the form (14) and (16), then we have to proceed
in blocks and convergence cannot hold at a faster rate than T−1/4. However, the associated
strategy is computationally efficient. Also, neither the convexity of C, nor the continuity of
ϕΨ or of Ψ are required, yet the stronger convergence (7) is achieved, not only (8).
5.2.2. Trading efficiency for a better rate; an interpretation of the
different rates
Theorem 11 shows that some set is approachable here, namely, the set GϕΨ defined in (8): it
is thus a B–set in the terminology of Spinat (2002), see also Hou (1971) as well as a remark
by Blackwell (1956). Therefore, there exists some (abstract and possibly computationally
extremely inefficient) strategy which approaches it at a 1/
√
T–rate. Indeed, the proof of
existence of such a strategy does not rely on any constructive argument.
4. This can be seen, e.g., by taking A = {1, 2} and binary payoffs gt,a ∈ {0, 1}. The expectation of the
per-round regret is larger than a positive constant when the gt,a are realizations of independent random
variables Gt,a identically distributed according to a symmetric Bernoulli distribution. In particular, the
regret is larger than this constant for some sequence of binary payoffs gt,a ∈ {0, 1}.
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Based on all remarks above, we may provide an intuitive interpretation of the T−1/4
rate obtained in Theorem 11, versus the 1/
√
T rate achieved either in our context by the
abstract strategy mentioned right above, or associated with Blackwell’s original strategy or
variations of it as the one by Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) in the classical case of known
games and sets C being known to be approachable. The interpretation is in terms of the
number of significant (costly) computational units Ncomp (projections, solutions of convex or
linear programs, etc.) to be performed. The strategies with the faster rate 1/
√
T perform
at least one or two of these units at each round, while our strategy does it only of the order
of
√
T times during T rounds—they are encompassed into the calls to Ψ and take place at
times t = k(k− 1)/2 + 1 for k > 1. In all these cases, the rate is proportional to √Ncomp/T .
5.2.3. On the related framework of Azar et al. (2014)
The setting considered therein is exactly the one described in Section 2; our works are
concurrent and independent. Crucial differences lie however in the aims pursued and in the
nature of the results obtained.
The quality of a strategy is evaluated by Azar et al. (2014) based on some quasi-concave
and Lipschitz function f : Rd → R. With the notation of Theorem 11 (the straightforward
extension to an unknown horizon T of) their aim is to guarantee that
lim inf
T→∞
{
f
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt mt
)
− min
k∈{1,...,nT−1}
max
x∈∆(A)
f
(
xm(k))} > 0 , (21)
where we recall that nT is of order
√
T . Azar et al. (2014) mention that this convergence
can take place at an optimal T−1/4 rate.
Satisfying (21) and recovering this optimal rate is actually a direct consequence of our
Theorem 11 and of the assumptions on f . Indeed, (14) and (16) together with the Lipschitz
assumption on f entail that
lim inf
T→∞
{
f
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt mt
)
− f
(
O(1/
√
T ) +
1
T
nT−1∑
k=1
kΨ(m(k))m(k)
)}
> 0 . (22)
The quasi-concavity of f implies that the image by f of a convex combination is larger than
the minimum of the images by f of the convex combinations. Thus, (22) yields in particular
lim inf
T→∞
{
f
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt mt
)
− min
k=1,...,nT−1
f
(
Ψ(m(k))m(k))} > 0 .
The convergence rate is the same as for (22), thus is of order at least T−1/4. Defining the
response function Ψ by Ψ(m) ∈ arg max
x∈∆(A)
f(xm), we get (21).
However, we need to underline that the aim (21) is extremely weak: assume, for instance,
that during some block Nature chooses m(k) with identical components such that
∀x ∈ ∆(A), f(xm(k)) = min f .
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Then (21) is satisfied irrespectively of the algorithm. On the contrary, the more demanding
aim (22) that we consider is not necessarily satisfied and an appropriate algorithm—as our
one—must be used.
In addition, the strategy designed by Azar et al. (2014) still requires some knowledge—
the set K of vectors of vector payoffs needs to be known (which is a severe restriction)—and
uses projections onto convex sets. The rate they obtain for their weaker aim is O(T−1/4),
as we get for our improved aim.
5.2.4. Links with the strategy of Bernstein and Shimkin (2015)
In this final paragraph of our discussion of Theorem 11 we review the strategy of Bernstein
and Shimkin (2015) and extend it, as much as it can be extended, to a setting as close as
possible to our setting of unknown games: see Figure 3. The extension however requires
that the set K of possible vectors of vector payoff is known to the decision-maker — an
assumption that we would not be ready to make.
Parameters: the set K, a response function Ψ : K → ∆(A)
Initialization: play an arbitrary x1 ∈ ∆(A), pick an arbitrary m˜1 ∈ K
For rounds t = 2, 3, . . .,
1. Update the discrepancy ∆t−1 =
t−1∑
τ=1
xτ mτ −
t−1∑
τ=1
Ψ
(
m˜s
) m˜s ;
2. Play a mixed action xt ∈ arg min
x∈∆(A)
max
m∈K
〈∆t−1, xm〉 ;
3. Compute m˜t ∈ arg max
m∈K
min
x∈∆(A)
〈∆t−1, xm〉 .
Figure 3: A generalization of the strategy of Bernstein and Shimkin (2015).
Theorem 13 For all response functions Ψ, the strategy of Figure 3 is such that for all
T > 1, for all sequences m1, . . . , mT ∈ (Rd)A of vectors of vector payoffs, possibly chosen
by an opponent player,wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
xt mt − 1
T
T∑
t=1
Ψ
(
m˜t
) m˜t
wwwww
2
6 2B2,max√
T
. (23)
The obtained bound is deterministic and uniform over all strategies of the opponent, just
as the bound of Theorem 11 was. Of course, the control (23) is a much weaker statement
than trying to force the convergence of the quantity (19) towards 0: to which set can we
guarantee that
T∑
t=1
Ψ
(
m˜t
) m˜t
belongs? It seems difficult to relate this quantity to the set CϕΨ(mT ) and get the convergence
dp
(
rT , CϕΨ(mT )
)→ 0 except in some special cases. The applications of Section 6 will further
underline this limitation.
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One of these special cases is when the set C is approachable, i.e., that the null target
function ϕ ≡ 0 is achievable. This assumption of approachability translates in our more
general case into the existence of a response function ΨC such that ΨC(m)  m ∈ C for
all m ∈ K. As advocated by Bernstein and Shimkin (2015), in such settings it is often
computationally feasible to access to ΨC(m) and less costly than performing projections
onto C.
In a nutshell, the strategy of Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) can be extended to the setting
of “almost unknown” games (the set K needs to be known), but the obtained convergence
guarantees are meaningful only under an assumption of approachability of the target set C.
One of the two sources of unknownness of our setting is then (almost) dealt with: the fact
that the underlying structure of the game is unknown, but not the fact that the target is
unknown as well.
Proof of Theorem 13 The construction of the strategy at hand and the proof of its
performance bound also follow some self-confident approach, as for Theorem 11; however,
no blocks are needed. We proceed as in (17) by developing the square Euclidian norm of
∆t+1 to relate it to the one of ∆t, where t > 1:
‖∆t+1‖22 = ‖∆t‖22 + 2
〈
∆t+1, xt+1 mt+1 −Ψ
(
m˜t+1
) m˜t+1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
60
+
wwxt+1 mt+1 −Ψ(m˜t+1) m˜t+1ww22︸ ︷︷ ︸
64B22,max
.
We show below that the inner product is non-positive, which after an immediate recurrence
shows that ‖∆t+1‖22 6 4B22,max(t+ 1)2 and concludes the proof.
Indeed, by von Neumann’s minmax theorem, using the definitions of xt+1 and m˜t+1,
max
m∈K
〈δt+1, xt+1 m〉 min
x∈∆(A)
max
m∈K
〈∆t+1, xm〉 = max
m∈K
min
x∈∆(A)
〈∆t+1, xm〉
= min
x∈∆(A)
〈
δt+1, x m˜t+1
〉
.
In particular, for all m′ ∈ K and x′∆(A),
〈δt+1, xt+1 m′〉 6 max
m∈K
〈δt+1, xt+1 m〉 = min
x∈∆(A)
〈
δt+1, x m˜t+1
〉
6
〈
δt+1, x
′  m˜t+1
〉
.
Choosing m′ = mt+1 and x′ = Ψ
(
m˜t+1
)
entails〈
∆t+1, xt+1 mt+1 −Ψ
(
m˜t+1
) m˜t+1〉 6 0
as used above to complete the induction.
5.2.5. Link with classical approachability, opportunistic approachability
We recall that in the setting of known finite games described in Section 2.2, vectors of vector
payoffs m actually correspond to the r( · , b). This defines the closed convex set K as the set
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of the r( · , y) for all mixed actions y ∈ ∆(B) of the opponent. Both strategies considered
therein relied on a response function Ψ = x? defined as
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), Ψ(r( · , y)) = x?(r( · , y)) ∈ arg min
x∈∆(A)
dp
(
r(x, y), C) .
Accessing to a value of this response function amounts to solving the convex program
min
∥∥∥∥∥∑
a∈A
xar(a, y)− c
∥∥∥∥∥
2
s.t. x ∈ ∆(A), c ∈ C ,
which can be done efficiently. (It even reduces to a quadratic problem when C is a polytope.)
Our algorithm based on this response function approaches the set Cαunif , where the
quantity αunif is defined in (4); it is not required to compute the said quantity αunif. The
same guarantee with the same remark apply to the two strategies presented in Section 2.2:
Blackwell’s strategy for the case p = 2 only, and the strategy by Bernstein and Shimkin
(2015) for all 0 < p 6 +∞. These three algorithms ensure in particular that the average
payoffs rT are asymptotically inside of or on the border of the set Cαunif .
Now, that αunif is null or positive indicates whether a convex set C is approachable or not.
But the problem of determining the approachability of a set is actually an extremely difficult
problem as even the determination of the approachability of the singleton set C = {0} in
known games is NP–hard to perform; see Mannor and Tsitsiklis (2009). To see that there
is no contradiction between being able to approach Cαunif and not being able to say that
αunif > 0 or not, note that none of the algorithms discussed above does, neither in advance
nor in retrospect, issue any statement on the value of αunif. They happen to perform
approachability to Cαunif for the specific sequence of actions chosen by the opponent but
do not determine a minimal approachable set which would be suited for all sequences of
actions. In particular, they do not provide a certificate of whether a given convex set C is
approachable or not.
Opportunistic approachability. In general, in known games, one has that the target
function considered above, ϕx
?
, satisfies ϕx
? ≺ αunif. That is, easy-to-control sequences of
vectors r( · , bt) can lead to an average payoff rT being much closer to C than the uniform
distance αunif: we get some pathwise refinement of classical approachability. This should be
put in correspondence with the recent, but different, notion of opportunistic approachability
(see Bernstein et al., 2013). However, quantifying exactly what we gain here with the
pathwise refinement would require much additional work (maybe a complete paper as the
one mentioned above) and this is why we do not explore further this issue.
6. Applications
In this section we work out two applications: learning while being evaluated with global
cost functions, and approachability under sample path constraints.
6.1. Global cost functions
This problem was introduced by Even-Dar et al. (2009) and slightly generalized by Bernstein
and Shimkin (2015). We first extend it to our setting of unknown games and describe what
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Theorem 11 guarantees in our case, and then compare our approach and results to the ones
of the two mentioned references. We keep the original terminology of global costs (thus to
be minimized) and do not switch to global gains (to be maximized), but such a substitution
would be straightforward.
Description of the problem in the case of unknown games. We denote by Kproj ⊂
Rd the closed convex and bounded set formed by the ma when m ∈ K and a ∈ A. A global
cost function is a mapping C : Kproj → R measuring the quality of any vector in Kproj. For
instance, the choice of a mixed action x ∈ ∆(A) given a vector of vector payoffs m ∈ K
is evaluated by C(x m); or the performance of the average payoff rT is equal to C(rT ).
Some regret is to be controlled to ensure that the latter quantity is small as well. Even-Dar
et al. (2009) and Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) defined this regret as
C(rT )− inf
x∈∆(A)
C(xmT ) = C(rT )− C?(mT ) (24)
where ∀m ∈ K, C?(m) = inf
x∈∆(A)
C(xm) .
Assuming that C is continuous, the infimum in the defining equation of C? is achieved and
we can thus construct a response function Ψ? : K → ∆(A) such that
∀m ∈ K, C(Ψ?(m)m) = min
x∈∆(A)
C(xm) = C?(m) . (25)
Actually, the proof techniques developed in the latter references (see the discussion below)
only ensure a vanishing regret for the convexification vex[C] of C and the concavification
cav[C?] of C?, i.e., they can only issue statements of the form
lim sup
T→∞
{
vex[C](rT )− cav[C?](mT )
}
6 0 ; (26)
they additionally get convergence rates when vex[C] is a Lipschitz function.
We recall that vex[C] 6 C and that cav[C?] > C?, so that the statements of the form
above are much weaker than the original aim (24), at least when C is not convex or C?
is not concave. A natural case when the latter assumptions are however satisfied is when
C = Cp is the `p–norm, for p > 1 (including the supremum norm p = +∞):
Cp
(
(u1, . . . , ud)
)
=
 d∑
j=1
upj
1/p and C+∞((u1, . . . , ud)) = max
j=1,...,d
|uj | .
Our main contribution: a better notion of regret. We will directly bound C(rT ),
whether C is convex or not, and will similarly relax the assumption of concavity of C?
needed in all mentioned references to tackle the desired regret (24).
To that end, we propose a notion of regret that is better in all cases (whether C and
C? are respectively convex and concave, or not). More precisely, we compare C(rT ) to a
quantity φΨ(mT ) based on any response function Ψ and which generalizes the definition (11):
for all m ∈ K,
φΨ(m) = sup
C
∑
i6N
λi Ψ(mi)mi
 : N > 1 and ∑
i6N
λimi = m
 .
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The extended notion of regret is then defined as C(rT )− φΨ(mT ).
We now explain why this new definition is always more ambitious than what could be
guaranteed so far by the literature, namely (26). Indeed, when C is convex and by definition
of Ψ?, we have in particular
φΨ
?
(m) 6 sup
∑
i6N
λiC
(
Ψ?(mi)mi
)
: N > 1 and
∑
i6N
λimi = m
 = cav[C?](m) .
The inequality stated above can be strict. For instance, as indicated in Section 4.2, when
C = dp( · , C
)
where C is convex, the global cost function C is indeed convex. We then have
φΨ
?
= ϕx
?
and cav[C?] = cav[ϕ?] ,
and thus we possibly have φΨ
? ≺ cav[C?], as stated in Lemma 8. The function C = dp( · , C
)
is also a Lipschitz function, which illustrates the interest of the second part of the following
corollary. We recall that B2,max denotes the maximal Euclidean norm of elements in K.
Corollary 14 For all response functions Ψ, when C is continuous and convex, the strategy
of Figure 2 ensures that, uniformly over all strategies of the opponent,
lim sup
T→∞
{
C(rT )− φΨ(mT )
}
6 0 . (27)
When C is in addition a Lipschitz function, with constant L for the `2–norm on Kproj, we
more precisely have
C(rT )− φΨ(mT ) 6 10LT−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxLT−1/2 .
Proof We apply Theorem 11 and use its notation. The function C is continuous thus
uniformly continuous on the compact set Kproj. Thus,wwrT − cTww2 −→ 0 entails C(rT )− C(cT ) −→ 0 ,
both convergences toward 0 being uniform over all strategies of the opponent. Now, by
definition of cT as a convex combination of elements of the form Ψ(mi)  mi, we have
C(cT ) 6 φΨ(mT ), which concludes the first part of the corollary.
The second part is proved in the same manner, simply by taking into account the
bound (14) and the fact that C is a Lipschitz function.
Discussion. As indicated in general in Section 2 we offered two extensions to the setting
of global costs: first, we explained how to deal with unknown games and second, indicated
what to aim for, given that the natural target is not necessarily approachable and that
sharper targets as the ones traditionally considered can be reached. The second contribution
is perhaps the most important one.
Indeed, the natural target (24) corresponds to ensuring the following convergence to a
set:
(rT ,mT ) −→ H where H =
{
(r,m) : C(r) 6 C?(m)
}
. (28)
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This target set H is not necessarily a closed, convex, and approachable set but its convex
hull co[H] is so, as proved by Even-Dar et al. (2009) and Bernstein and Shimkin (2015).
This convex hull is exactly equal to
co[H] = {(r,m) : vex[C](r) 6 cav[C?](m)} .
We replace the convergence of (rT ,mT ) to the above convex hull co[H] by a convergence
to, e.g., the smaller set {
(r,m) : C(r) 6 φΨ?(m)
}
.
Such a convergence is ensured by (27) and the continuity of C, and this set is smaller than
co[H] as follows from the discussion before Corollary 14.
Even-Dar et al. (2009) use directly Blackwell’s approachability strategy to approach
co[H], which requires the computation of projections onto co[H], a possibly computationally
delicate task. We thus only focus on how Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) proceed and will
explain why the obtained guarantee of convergence to co[H] cannot be easily improved with
their strategy. We apply Theorem 13 to a lifted space of payoffs K ⊂ Rd × (Rd)A. Namely,
with each m ∈ K, we associate m ∈ K defined as
∀ a ∈ A, ma =
[
ma
m
]
∈ Rd × (Rd)A . (29)
That is, the component a ∈ A of m contains the corresponding component ma of m as well
as the vector m itself. In particular,
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt mt =
[
rT
mT
]
.
We pick the response function Ψ? : K → ∆(A) corresponding to the base response function
Ψ? defined in (25): Ψ?(m) = Ψ?(m). Then, the convergence (23) readswwwww
[
rT
mT
]
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
Ψ?
(
m˜t
) m˜t
wwwww
2
=
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
xt mt −
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ψ?
(
m˜t
) m˜t
wwwww
2
−→ 0 ,
(30)
for some m˜1, m˜2, . . . in K. By definition of K and Ψ?, for all t > 1,
Ψ?
(
m˜t
) m˜t = [ Ψ?(m˜t) m˜tm˜t
]
∈ {(r,m) : C(r) 6 C?(m)} ⊆ H .
Thus, the convex combination of the Ψ?
(
m˜t
)  m˜t belongs to co[H] and the conver-
gence (28) is achieved. Under additional regularity assumptions (e.g., continuity of vex[C]
and cav[C?]), the stronger convergence (26) holds as can be seen by adapting the arguments
used in the second part of Section C.1.
However, the limitations of the approach of Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) are twofold.
First, as already underline in Section 5.2.4, the sets K or equivalently K need to be known
to the strategy; thus the game is not fully unknown. Second, there is no control on where
the m˜t or m˜t lie, and therefore, there is no reasonable hope to refine the convergence (28)
to a convergence to a set smaller than co[H] and defined in terms of mT as in our approach.
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6.2. Approachability under sample path constraints
We generalize here the setting of regret minimization in known finite games under sample
path constraints, as introduced by Mannor et al. (2009) and further studied by Bernstein
and Shimkin (2015). The straightforward enough generalization is twofold: we deal with
approachability rather than just with regret; we consider unknown games.
Description of the problem in the case of unknown games. A vector in Kproj ⊂ Rd
now not only represents some payoff but also some cost. The aim of the player here is
to control the average payoff vector (to have it converge to the smallest expansion of a
given closed convex target set P) while abiding by some cost constraints (ensuring that the
average cost vector converges to a prescribed closed convex set Γ).
Formally, two matrices G and C, of respective sizes g × d and γ × d, associate with
a vector ma ∈ Kproj ⊂ Rd a payoff vector Gma ∈ Rg and a cost vector Cma ∈ Rγ . For
instance, when the decision-maker chooses a mixed action x ∈ ∆(A) and the vector of vector
payoffs is m ∈ K, she gets an instantaneous payoff G(x m) and suffers an instantaneous
cost C(xm). The admissible costs are represented by a closed convex set Γ ⊆ Rγ , while
some closed convex payoff set P ⊆ Rg is to be approached.
The question is in particular what the decision-maker should aim for: the target is
unknown. Following the general aim (3) and generalizing the aims of Mannor et al. (2009)
and Bernstein and Shimkin (2015), we assume that she wants the following convergences
to take place, uniformly over all strategies of the opponent: as T →∞,
dp
(
GrT , Pϕ(mT )
) −→ 0 and dp(CrT , Γ) −→ 0 , (31)
for some target function ϕ to be defined (being as small as possible). That is, she wants to
control her average payoff GrT as well as she can while ensuring that asymptotically, her
average cost CrT lies in the set Γ of admissible costs.
To make the problem meaningful and as in the original references, we assume that the
cost constraint is feasible.
Assumption 2 For all m ∈ K, there exists x ∈ ∆(A) such that G(xm) ∈ Γ.
What the general result of Theorem 11 states. We consider mostly the following
response function x?Γ: for all m ∈ K,
x?Γ(m) ∈ arg min
{
dp
(
G(xm), P) : x ∈ ∆(A) s.t. G(xm) ∈ Γ} ,
which provides the instantaneous-best and cost-abiding response. The defining minimum
is indeed achieved by continuity as both P and Γ are closed sets. Since in addition P and
Γ are convex, the defining equation of x?Γ is a convex optimization problem under a convex
constraint and can be solved efficiently.
Of course, more general (preferably also cost-abiding) response functions can be consid-
ered. By a cost-abiding response function Ψ, we mean any response function such that
∀m ∈ K, C(Ψ(m)m) ∈ Γ .
This property is indeed satisfied by x?Γ.
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We adapt the definition (11) of the target function based on some response function Ψ
to only consider payoffs: for all m ∈ K,
φΨ(m) = sup
dp
G∑
i6N
λi Ψ(mi)mi, P
 : N > 1 and ∑
i6N
λimi = m
 .
A discussion below will explain why such goals, e.g., (31) with ϕ = φx
?
Γ , are more ambitious
than the aims targeted in the original references, which essentially consisted of shooting for
(31) with ϕ = cav[φ?] only and in restricted cases (uni-dimensional ones, g = 1), where for
all m ∈ K,
φ?(m) = dp
(
G
(
x?Γ(m)m
)
, P
)
. (32)
Corollary 15 For all cost-abiding response functions Ψ, the strategy of Figure 2 ensures
that for all T > 1 and for all strategies of the opponent,
dp
(
GrT , PφΨ(mT )
)
6LG
(
10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2
)
and dp
(
CrT , Γ
)
6LC
(
10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2
)
,
where LG, respectively, LC , is a norm on G, respectively, C, seen as a linear function from
Rd equipped with the `2–norm to Rg, respectively, Rγ, equipped with the `p–norm.
In particular, the aim (31) is achieved.
Proof We apply Theorem 11 and use its notation. By (14) and by definition of LC ,wwCrT − CcTwwp 6 LC(10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2) .
Because Ψ was assumed to be cost-abiding and in view of the form (16) of cT , we have
CcT ∈ Γ and we thus have proved
dp
(
CrT , Γ
)
6 LC
(
10T−1/4 lnA+ 3B2,maxT−1/2
)
.
A similar argument, based on the fact that GcT ∈ PφΨ(mT ) by definition of φΨ, yields the
stated bound for dp
(
GrT , PφΨ(mT )
)
.
What the extension of earlier results, e.g., Theorem 13, yields. As indicated sev-
eral times already, Mannor et al. (2009) and Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) only considered
the case of regret minimization, i.e., a special case of approachability when G is a linear
form (g = 1) and P is an interval of the form [G∞,+∞) where G∞ is a bound on the values
taken by G. We will discuss this special case below.
The strategies considered by Mannor et al. (2009) were not efficient (they relied on being
able to project on complicated sets or resorted to calibrated auxiliary strategies), unlike the
one studied by Bernstein and Shimkin (2015). We will thus focus on the latter. The (not
necessarily convex) target set considered therein is
H = {(r,m) : Cr ∈ Γ and dp(Gr,P) 6 φ?(m)} ,
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where φ? was defined in (32). Because P is convex and G is linear, the function r ∈ Rd 7→
dp(Gr,P) is convex; see, e.g., Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004, Example 3.16). The convex
hull of H thus equals
co[H] = {(r,m) : Cr ∈ Γ and dp(Gr,P) 6 cav[φ?](m)} .
To be able to compare the merits of the strategy by Bernstein and Shimkin (2015) to
Corollary 15, we first extend it to the case of unknown games, based on Theorem 13. To
that end we consider the same lifting as in (29) and apply similarly Theorem 13 to get (30)
as well, for the cost-abiding response function x?Γ. Using that in this case, by definition
of x?Γ,
Ψ?
(
m˜t
) m˜t = [ x?Γ(m˜t) m˜tm˜t
]
∈ H ,
the convergence (30) rewriteswwwww
[
rT
mT
]
− 1
T
T∑
t=1
[
x?Γ
(
m˜t
) m˜t
m˜t
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈ co[H]
wwwww
2
−→ 0
and entails the convergence of (rT ,mT ) to co[H]. In particular, CrT → Γ. Under an
additional regularity assumption, e.g., the continuity of cav[φ?], we also get (by adapting
the arguments used in the second part of Section C.1) the stronger convergence
lim sup
T→∞
{
dp(GrT ,P)− cav[φ?](mT )
}
6 0 ,
that is, lim sup
T→∞
dp
(
GrT , Pcav[φ?](mT )
)
6 0 .
Summarizing, the convergence (31) is guaranteed with ϕ = cav[φ?]; an inspection of the
arguments above shows that cav[φ?] being actually uniformly continuous, the desired uni-
formity over the strategies of the opponent is achieved.
The same limitations to this approach as mentioned at the end of the previous section
arise as far as the concepts of unknown game and unknown target are concerned. First,
the set K needs to be known to the strategy and the game is not fully unknown. Second,
there is no control on where the m˜t lie, and therefore, there is no reasonable hope to refine
the convergence (31) with ϕ = cav[φ?] into a convergence with a smaller target function ϕ.
In contrast, Corollary 15 provided such a refinement with ϕ = φx
?
Γ , which by convexity of
r ∈ Rd 7→ dp(Gr,P) is smaller and possibly strictly smaller than cav[φ?] (adapt Lemma 8
to prove the strict inequality).
A note on known games. However, Mannor et al. (2009, Section 5) exhibit a class of
cases when cav[φ?] is the optimal target function: in known games, with scalar payoffs and
scalar constraints, and with set of constraints of the form Γ = (−∞, c0]. This amounts to
minimizing some constrained regret.
We thus briefly indicate what known games are in this context, as defined by Mannor
et al. (2009) and Bernstein and Shimkin (2015). Some linear scalar payoff function u :
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∆(A)×∆(B)→ [0, G∞] and some linear vector-valued cost function v : ∆(A)×∆(B)→ Rγ
are given. (With no loss of generality we can assume that the payoff function takes values
in a bounded nonnegative interval.) The set K of our general formulation corresponds to
the vectors, as y describes ∆(B), [
u( · , y)
v( · , y)
]
∈ R× Rγ .
The matrices G and C extract respectively the first component and all but the first com-
ponent. Regret is considered, that is, the payoff set P to be be approached given the
constraints is [G∞, +∞). The expansions are Pα = [G∞ − α, +∞). The distance of some
r ∈ R to some Pα equals (G∞ − α− r)+.
In this context, convergences of the form (31) thus read
1
T
T∑
t=1
v(xt, bt) −→ Γ and lim inf
T→∞
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(xt, bt)−
(
G∞ − ϕ
(
(uT , vT )
))}
> 0 ,
(33)
where [
uT
vT
]
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
u( · , bt)
v( · , bt)
]
,
and thus correspond to some constrained regret-minimization problems. Indeed, denoting
yT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
δbt
the empirical frequency of actions bt ∈ B taken by the opponent, and recalling that u is
bounded by G∞, we have, for instance, when ϕ = φ?,
φ?
(
(uT , vT )
)
= G∞ − u?Γ(yT )
where u?Γ(y) = max
{
u(x, y) : x ∈ ∆(A) s.t. v(x, y) ∈ Γ} . (34)
The convergence (33) finally reads when ϕ = φ?:
1
T
T∑
t=1
v(xt, bt) −→ Γ and lim inf
T→∞
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(xt, bt)− u?Γ(yT )
}
> 0 . (35)
Just as we showed (in Section 3.1) that in general the target function φ? is not achievable,
Mannor et al. (2009, Section 3) showed that the constrained regret with respect to u?Γ(yT )
defined in (35) cannot be minimized.
The proposed relaxation was to consider its convexification vex[u?Γ] instead in (35), which
corresponds to cav[φ?] in (34). In this specific one-dimensional setting, the target function
φx
?
Γ equals cav[φ?]: our general theory provides no improvement. This is in line with the
optimality result for cav[φ?] exhibited by Mannor et al. (2009, Section 5) in this case.
31
Mannor, Perchet, Stoltz
6.3. Approachability of an approachable set at a minimal cost
This is the dual problem of the previous problem: have the vector-valued payoffs approach
an approachable convex set while suffering some costs and trying to control the overall cost.
In this case, the set P is fixed and the α–expansions are in terms of the set of constraints
Γ. Actually, this is a problem symmetric to the previous one, when the roles of G and P
are exchanged with C and Γ.
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Appendix A. Link with regret minimization in unknown games
The problem of regret minimization can be encompassed as an instance of approachability.
We recall here why the knowledge of the payoff structure is not crucial for this very specific
problem. (This, of course, is not the case at all for general approachability problems.)
Indeed, with the notation of Section 2.2, the aim of regret minimization, in a known
finite game with payoff function s : A× B, is for the decision-maker to ensure that
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
s(at, bt)−max
a∈A
1
T
T∑
t=1
s(a, bt) > 0 a.s.
This can be guaranteed by approaching (R−)A with the vector payoff function r : A×B →
RA defined by
r(a, b) =
(
s(a′, b)− s(a, b))
a′∈A . (36)
The necessary and sufficient condition for approachability of the closed convex set (R−)A
is satisfied for r. The condition (5) rewrites in our case
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), 〈r˜t−c˜t, r(xt+1, y)−c˜t〉 = 〈(r˜t)+, r(xt+1, y)+(r˜t)−〉 = 〈(r˜t)+, r(xt+1, y)〉 6 0 ,
where ( · )+ and ( · )+ denote respectively the vectors formed by taking the nonnegative
and non-positive parts of the original components of the vector of interest. Now, using the
specific form of r, we see that〈(
r˜t
)
+
, r(xt+1, y)
〉
=
∑
a′∈A
(
r˜t,a′
)
+
s(a′, y)−
(∑
a′∈A
(
r˜t,a′
)
+
)
s(xt+1, y) .
Either all components of r˜t are non-positive, i.e., r˜t is already in (R−)A, or we can choose
the mixed distribution xt+1 defined by
∀ a ∈ A, xt+1,a =
(
r˜t,a
)
+∑
a′∈A
(
r˜t,a′
)
+
. (37)
In the latter case, we then get
∀ y ∈ ∆(B), 〈r˜t − c˜t, r(xt+1, y)− c˜t〉 = 〈(r˜t)+, r(xt+1, y)〉 = 0 ,
and (5) is in particular satisfied.
The knowledge of s (or r) is not crucial here. Comments have to be made on the
specific choice of xt+1: it is independent of the payoff structure s (or r), it only depends on
the past payoff vectors s( · , bτ ), where τ 6 t.
In particular, the strategy above to minimize the regret can be generalized in a straight-
forward way to the case of games with full monitoring but whose payoff structure is un-
known. In these games, at each round, the opponent chooses a payoff vector
gt = (gt,a)a∈A ,
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the decision-maker chooses an action at ∈ A and observes the entire vector gt, while wanting
to ensure that the regret vanishes,
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt,at −max
a∈A
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt,a > 0 a.s. (38)
It suffices to replace all occurrences of s( · , bt) above by gt. In particular, the payoff function
r defined in (36) is to be replaced by the vectors of vector payoffs mt ∈ RA×A whose
components equal
∀ a ∈ A, mt,a =
(
gt,a′ − gt,a
)
a′∈A .
A note on the bandit monitoring: the case of unknown games. In the case of an
unknown game (i.e., when the payoff structure is unknown and when only bandit monitoring
is available), the generic trick presented around (2) should be adapted, as indicated by
Footnote 1. Indeed, the only feedback available at the end of each round is gt,at and not
mt,at . The estimation to be performed is rather on the vectors gt than on the mt: for all
a ∈ A,
ĝt,a =
gt,a
xt,a
I{a=at} ,
with the same constraints xt,a > γt for all t > 1, from which we define
m̂t,a =
(
ĝt,a′ − ĝt,a
)
a′∈A .
Substituting the estimates ĝt in the strategy defined around (37) in lieu of the vectors
s( · , bt) ensures that the regret vanishes.
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Appendix B. Calculations associated with Examples 1 and 2
B.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof for Example 1 Assume by contradiction that the convergence (3) can be achieved
and consider any strategy of the decision maker to do so, which we denote by σ. It suffices
to consider the almost sure convergence (3), the stronger uniformity requirements stated
after it will not be invoked. All statements in the sequel hold almost surely, and quantities
like Tε and T
′
ε should be thought of as random variables.
Imagine in a first time that opponent chooses, at every stage t > 1, the vectors mt = m†.
We have ϕ?(m†) = 4, the smallest of the supremum norms of m†1 and m
†
2. The aim is then
that the average payoffs rT converge to C4. But this can be guaranteed only if the averages
of the chosen mixed actions xt converge to (1, 0). That is, given ε > 0, there exists some,
possibly large, integer Tε such that∥∥∥∥rTε − [ 34
]∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ε . (39)
Now, consider a second scenario. During the first Tε stages, the opponent chooses the
vectors mt = m
†. By construction, as the strategy σ is fixed, (39) is ensured. Now, in
the next Tε stages, for Tε + 1 6 t 6 2Tε, assume that the opponent chooses the vectors
mt = m
], and denote by γε ∈ [0, 1] the average of the first components xt,1 ∈ [0, 1] of the
mixed actions xt selected by σ in this second set of stages. We have m2Tε = m
(1/2), where
m(1/2) =
1
2
m† +
1
2
m] has components m
(1/2)
1 =
[
3.5
3.5
]
and m
(1/2)
2 =
[
2.5
2.5
]
.
Therefore the target set is Cϕ?(m2Tε ) = C2.5. However, by definition of γε, we have
r2Tε =
1
2
rTε+
1
2
2Tε∑
t=Tε+1
xtm] = 1
2
rTε+
1
2
(
γε
[
4
3
]
+ (1− γε)
[
5
0
])
=
1
2
rTε+
1
2
[
5− γε
3γε
]
,
and therefore, because of (39),∥∥∥∥r2Tε − [ 4− γε/22 + 3γε/2
]∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ε
2
.
This entails that
d∞
(
r2Tε , Cϕ?(m2Tε )
)
> d∞
([
4− γε/2
2 + 3γε/2
]
, C2.5
)
− ε
2
> 1− ε/2 .
This construction can be repeated again after stage 2Tε, by choosing mt = m
† till a
stage T ′ε is reached when ∥∥∥∥r2Tε+T ′ε − [ 34
]∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ε
2
;
such a stage exists by the assumption that the convergence (3) is achieved by the strategy
σ. One can then similarly see that
d∞
(
r2Tε+2T ′ε , Cϕ?(m2Tε+2T ′ε )
)
> 1− ε/4 .
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By repeating this over again and again, one proves that
lim sup
T→∞
d∞
(
rT , Cϕ?(mT )
)
> 1 ,
which contradicts the assumption that σ ensures the convergence (3). The claim follows.
Proof for Example 2 (sketch) The same construction as for the previous example holds,
by switching between a first regime when mt = (−1, 1) ∈ R2 is chosen and at the end of
which the average payoff should be close to null, rTε 6 ε. Then, another regime of the
same length starts with mt = (1, 1) ∈ R2 and no matter what the decision-maker does, she
will get an average payoff of 1 in this regime. In total, at the end of the second regime,
r2Tε > 1/2− ε while the target set is given by
Cϕ?(m2Tε ) = Cϕ?((0,1)) = C0 = {0} , as m2Tε = (0, 1) ∈ R2 .
This can be repeated over and over again.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 4
Proof for Example 1 We have cav[ϕ?] ≡ 4. To prove this fact, we first compute ϕ?. For
ν ∈ [0, 1], the components of m(ν) = νm† + (1− ν)m] equal
m
(ν)
1 = ν
[
3
4
]
+ (1− ν)
[
4
3
]
=
[
4− ν
3 + ν
]
and m
(ν)
2 = ν
[
0
5
]
+ (1− ν)
[
5
0
]
=
[
5− 5ν
5ν
]
.
Therefore,
ϕ?
(
m(ν)
)
= min
{
max{4− ν, 3 + ν}, max{5− 5ν, 5ν}} =

4− ν if ν ∈ [0, 1/4],
5− 5ν if ν ∈ [1/4, 1/2],
5ν if ν ∈ [1/2, 3/4],
3 + ν if ν ∈ [3/4, 1].
(40)
We note that ϕ?
(
m†
)
= ϕ?
(
m]
)
= 4 and that ϕ? 6 4, so that cav[ϕ?] is identically equal
to 4 on the set K defined as the convex hull of m† and m].
Smaller target functions ϕ such that the convergence (3) holds can be considered. This
proves in particular that (3) can also be guaranteed for the larger cav[ϕ?]. Indeed,
ϕ1
(
m(ν)
)
= max{4− ν, 3 + ν}
is smaller than cav[ϕ?] ≡ 4 (and even strictly smaller when ν 6= 0 and ν 6= 1); see Figure 4. In
addition, the convergence (3) can hold for it. Indeed, if the decision-maker plays xt = (1, 0)
at each round, i.e., always picks the first component of mt, then her average payoff equals
rT = mT,1, where mT = m
(νT ) for some νT ∈ [0, 1]. By definition of ϕ1, the distance of
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We then compute ϕ? using (4):
ϕ?(ν) = min
x∈[0,1]
αx(ν) = min
{
α0(ν), α1(ν)
}
=

4− ν if ν ∈ [0, 1/4],
5− 5ν if ν ∈ [1/4, 1/2],
5ν if ν ∈ [1/2, 3/4],
3 + ν if ν ∈ [3/4, 1].
This last set of equalities can be seen to hold true by contemplating Figure 2.
C C2.5 C4
m†
m]
2.5
4
5
ϕ?
m†m]
αx
Figure 2: Graphical representation of m† and m], and of different expansions Cα (left); graphs
of the functions ϕ? (bold solid line), of α0 and α1 (dotted lines), and of some αx, for
x ∈ [0, 1] (thin solid line).
Proof [of Lemma 4] Assume by contradiction that ϕ? is achievable in the above example and
consider any strategy of the decision maker to do so, which we denote by σ. Imagine in a first time
that Nature chooses, at every stage t > 1, the vectors mt = m†, which amounts to playing νt = 1.
Given that the average of the νt equals νT = 1 and that its image by ϕ? equals ϕ?(1) = 4, the aim
is then to converge to C4. But this can only be guaranteed if the average of the chosen xt converges
to 1. That is, given ε > 0, there exists some, possibly large, integer Tε such that∥∥∥∥rTε − [ 34
]∥∥∥∥
∞
6 ε . (21)
Now, consider a second scenario. During the first Tε stages, Nature chooses the vectors mt = m†.
By construction, as σ is fixed, (21) is ensured. Now, for the next Tε stages, for Tε + 1 6 t 6 2Tε,
assume that Nature chooses the vectors mt = m], and denote by γ ∈ [0, 1] the average of the
xt ∈ [0, 1] selected by σ. The average of the played vectors is m2Tε corresponds to ν = 1/2, whose
image by ϕ? equals ϕ?(1/2) = 5/2. Therefore the target set is C2.5. However, by definition of γ,
we have
r2Tε =
1
2
rTε +
1
2
2Tε∑
t=Tε+1
xt m] = 1
2
rTε +
1
2
(
γ
[
4
3
]
+ (1− γ)
[
5
0
])
=
1
2
rTε +
1
2
([
5− γ
3γ
])
,
23
Figure 4: Graphs of the functions ϕ? (bold solid line) and ϕ1 (dotted line).
m
(ν)
1 to (−∞, 0]2 in the supremum norm is precisely ϕ1
(
m(ν)
)
. Therefore, we even have in
this case
d∞
(
rT , Cϕ1(mT )
)
= 0 ,
which proves in particular that the convergence (3) holds for ϕ1.
Proof for Example 2 The computations are more involved in this seemingly simpler
example. As before, we start by computing ϕ?. We refer to vectors m ∈ [−1, 1]2 chosen
by the opponent as m = (v, w) and to the mixed actions picked by the decision-maker by
x = (x1, 1− x1), where x1 ∈ [0, 1]. The absolute value of a convex combination of v and w
is to be minimized. This is achieved with
x?
(
(v, w)
)
=

(1, 0) if 0 < v 6 w or 0 > v > w,
(0, 1) if 0 < w < v or 0 > w > v,( |w|
|v|+ |w| ,
|v|
|v|+ |w|
)
if v w 6 0,
which leads to
ϕ?
(
(v, w)
)
=
{
min
{|v|, |w|} if v w > 0,
0 if v w 6 0.
The concavification of ϕ? thus admits the following expression: for all v, w ∈ [−1, 1]2,
cav[ϕ?]
(
(v, w)
)
= 1− |v − w|
2
.
We replace a lengthy and tedious proof of this expression by the graphical illustrations
provided by Figure 5.
Now, we consider the target function ϕ1/2 defined as
ϕ1/2
(
(v, w)
)
=
|v + w|
2
. (41)
We denote mT =
(
vT , wT
)
. By playing xt = (1/2, 1/2) at each round, the decision-maker
ensures that
rT =
vT + wT
2
while ϕ1/2
(
mT
)
=
∣∣∣∣vT + wT2
∣∣∣∣ .
Thus, for this example again (in which the `p–norm can be chosen freely), we have
dp
(
rT , Cϕ1/2(mT )
)
= 0 .
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ϕ?
0
0
0
1
1
v
w
cav[ϕ?]
0
1
1
1− |v−w|2
Figure 3: Representations of ϕ? (left) and of its concavification cav[ϕ?] (right).
Proof [of Lemma 4] The same construction as for the previous example holds, by switching be-
tween regimes when mt = (−1, 1) is chosen and at the end of which the average payoff should
be close to null, rT 6 ε. Then, another regime of the same length starts with mt = (1, 1) and no
matter what the decision-maker does, she will get an average payoff of 1 in this regime. In total,
rT > 1/2− ε while the target, that is, the image of m2T = (0, 1) by ϕ?, equals ϕ?(0, 1) = 0. This
can be repeated over and over again.
Proof [of the second part of Lemma 6] We consider α1/2(v, w) = |v +w|/2, which is an achiev-
able target function; it indeed suffices to play xt = (1/2, 1/2) at each round. The inequality
α1/2 6 cav[ϕ?] follows from the fact that, |v + w| + |v − w| = max
{|v|, |w|} 6 2. That this
inequality can be strict is seen, e.g., at (0, 0). As a conclusion, we have α1/2 ≺ cav[ϕ?]. (This is
illustrated by Figures 3 and 4.)
The proof below illustrates what we could call a “sign compensation.” The absolute values of
the convex combinations considered in (22) can be (much) smaller than the convex combinations of
the absolute values of their elements, as considered in the expression of cav[ϕ?]; it can indeed be
seen in our example (given the form of the sets Cα) that
cav[ϕ?](v, w) = sup
{
N∑
i=1
λi
∣∣x?(vi, wi) (vi, wi)∣∣ : N > 1 and N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
.
Proof [of the second part of Lemma 7] According to (8) and given the form of the sets Cα, the
target function ϕx
?
is defined as
ϕx
?
(v, w) = sup
{∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
λi x
?(vi, wi) (vi, wi)
∣∣∣∣∣ : N > 1 and
N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
. (22)
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By a tedious case study consisting of identifying the worst convex decompositions
∑
λi(vi, wi),
one then gets the explicit expression
ϕx
?
(v, w) =

(
1 + |v + w|)/3 if |2w − w| 6 1 and |2v − w| 6 1,
(1 + v)/2 if 2w − v > 1 and v + w > 0,
(1 + w)/2 if 2v − w > 1 and v + w > 0,
(1− v)/2 if 2w − v 6 −1 and v + w 6 0,
(1− w)/2 if 2v − w 6 −1 and v + w > 0,
which shows that ϕx
? 6 cav[ϕ?]. Admittedly, a picture would help: we provide one as Figure 4.
1+|x+y|
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1−x
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Figure 4: R presentations in 2D – 3D of ϕx
?
α1/2.
We conclude our discussion of this example by showing that even ϕx
?
can be improved. Indeed,
it was constructed by choosing the response function Ψ = x?, that is, somehow by having the un-
achievable target function ϕ? in mind. This response function, as the main algorithm below shows,
is a short-term reply to a local average of vectors of vector payoffs. More reasonable quantities
should be targeted; quite surprisingly we illustrate below that relaxing the short-terms expectations
also results in better long-term payoffs. For instance, if the decision maker knows in advance that
the next vectors will be mt = (0, 1), she should not worry about getting ϕ?(0, 1) = 0, and thus,
playing xt = (1, 0); she could well be satisfied with ϕ?(0, 1) = 1/2, and thus play xt = (1/2, 1/2).
It turns out that the same argument can be performed at each (v, w).
Proof [of the second part of Lemma 8] The target function ϕ = α1/2 already considered above is
such that α1/2 ≺ ϕx? as can be seen on a picture.
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Figure 3: Representations f ϕ? (left) and of its concavification cav[ϕ?] (right).
Proof [of Lemma 4] The same construction as for the previous example holds, by switching be-
tween regimes when mt = (−1, 1) is chos n and t the end of which the average payoff should
be clos to null,rT 6 ε. Then, another reg me of the same length starts with mt = (1, 1) and no
matter what the decision-maker does, she will get an average payoff of 1 in this regime. In total,
rT > 1/2− ε while the target, that is, the im ge of m2T (0, 1) by ϕ?, equals ϕ?(0, 1) = 0. This
c n be repeated over and over again.
Proof [of the second part of Lemma 6] We consider α1/2(v, w) = |v +w|/2, which is an achiev-
able target function; it indeed suffices to play xt = (1/2, 1/2) at each round. The inequality
α1/2 6 c v[ϕ?] follows from the fact that, |v + w| + |v − w| = max
{|v|, |w|} 6 2. That this
inequ lity can be strict is seen, e.g., at (0, 0). As a conclusion, we have α1/2 ≺ cav[ϕ?]. (This is
illustrated by Figures 3 and 4.)
The pr of below illustrates what we could call a “sign compensation.” The absolute values of
th co vex combinations considered in (22) ca be (much) smaller than the convex combinations of
the absolute values of their elements, as considered in the expression of cav[ϕ?]; it can indeed be
seen in our example (given the form of the sets Cα) that
cav[ϕ?](v, w) = sup
{
N∑
i=1
λi
∣∣x?(vi, wi) i, i ∣∣ : N > 1 and N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
.
Proof [of the seco d part of Lemma 7] According to (8) and given the form of the sets Cα, the
target function ϕx
?
is defined as
ϕx
?
(v, w) = sup
{∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
λi x
?(vi, wi) i, i
∣∣∣∣∣ : N > 1 and
N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
. (22)
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Figure 5: Representations of ϕ? (left), of the alternative target function ϕ1/2 (center), and
of the concavification cav[ϕ?] (right).
The convergence (3) holds for ϕ1/2 and also for cav[ϕ
?], since the latter is larger than ϕ1/2
(st ictly larger at some points). Inde d, the inequality α1/2 6 cav[ϕ?] follows from the fact
that
|v + w|+ |v − w| = max{|v|, |w|} 6 2 .
That the inequality α1/2 6 cav[ϕ?] can be strict i seen, e.g., at (0, 0). Again, an illustration
is provided by Figure 5.
B.3. Proof of Lemma 8
Proof for Example 2 The proof below illu rates what we could call a “sign compe sa-
tion.” We have here, for all (v, w) ∈ R2,
cav[ϕ?]
(
(v, w)
)
= sup
{
N∑
i=1
λi
∣∣x?((vi, wi)) (vi, wi)∣∣ : N > 1 and N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
,
ϕx
?(
(v, w)
)
= sup
{∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
λi x
?
(
(vi, wi)
) (vi, wi)
∣∣∣∣∣ : N > 1 and
N∑
i=1
λi(vi, i) (v, w)
}
.
By a tedious case study consisting of identifying the worst convex decompositions
∑
λi(vi, wi),
one then gets the explicit expression
ϕx
?(
(v, w)
)
=

(
1 + |v + w|)/3 if |2w − v| 6 1 and |2v − w| 6 1,
(1 + v)/2 if 2w − v > 1 and v + w > 0,
(1 + w)/2 if 2v − w > 1 and v + w > 0,
(1− v)/2 if 2w − v 6 −1 and v + w 6 0,
(1− w)/2 if 2v − w 6 −1 and v + w 6 0,
(42)
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to be compared to the closed-form expression obtained earlier for cav[ϕ?], namely
cav[ϕ?]
(
(v, w)
)
= 1− |v − w|
2
.
Admittedly, a picture would help: we provide one as Figure 6. We see (on the picture or
1+|v+w|
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1+v
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2
Figure 1: Representations in 2D – 3D of ϕx
?
and of α1/2.
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Figure 3: Representations of ϕ? (left) and of its concavification cav[ϕ?] (right).
Proof [of Lemma 4] The same construction as for the previous example holds, by switching be-
tween regimes when mt = (−1, 1) is chosen and at the end of which the average payoff should
be close to null,rT 6 ε. Then, another regime of the same length starts with mt = (1, 1) and no
matter what the decision-maker does, she will get an average payoff of 1 in this regime. In total,
rT > 1/2− ε while the target, that is, the image of m2T = (0, 1) by ϕ?, equals ϕ?(0, 1) = 0. This
can be repeated over and over again.
Proof [of the second part of Lemma 6] We consider α1/2(v, w) = |v +w|/2, which is an achiev-
able target function; it indeed suffices to play xt = (1/2, 1/2) at each round. The inequality
α1/2 6 cav[ϕ?] follows from the fact that, |v + w| + |v − w| = max
{|v|, |w|} 6 2. That this
inequality can be strict is seen, e.g., at (0, 0). As a conclusion, we have α1/2 ≺ cav[ϕ?]. (This is
illustrated by Figures 3 and 4.)
The proof below illustrates what we could call a “sign compensation.” The absolute values of
the convex combinations considered in (22) can be (much) smaller than the convex combinations of
the absolute values of their elements, as considered in the expression of cav[ϕ?]; it can indeed be
seen in our example (given the form of the sets Cα) that
cav[ϕ?](v, w) = sup
{
N∑
i=1
λi
∣∣x?(vi, wi) (vi, wi)∣∣ : N > 1 and N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
.
Proof [of the second part of Lemma 7] According to (8) and given the form of the sets Cα, the
target function ϕx
?
is defined as
ϕx
?
(v, w) = sup
{∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
λi x
?(vi, wi) (vi, wi)
∣∣∣∣∣ : N > 1 and
N∑
i=1
λi(vi, wi) = (v, w)
}
. (22)
26
Figure 6: Representations in 2D – 3D of ϕx
?
(left and center) and 3D representation of
cav[ϕ?].
by direct calculations) that ϕx
? 6 cav[ϕ?], and even that ϕx? ≺ cav[ϕ?], by considering the
respective values 1/3 and 1 at (0, 0).
Proof for Example 1 We ill prove tha ϕx
?
= ϕ1 so that the result will follow from the
inequality ϕ1 ≺ cav[ϕ?] alr ady proved in Section B.2.
Indeed, as can be seen in the computations leading to the closed-form expression (40)
of ϕ?, we have
x?
(
m(ν)
)
=
{
(1, 0) if ν ∈ [0, 1/4] ∪ [3/4, 1],
(0, 1) if ν ∈ [1/4, 3/4].
Therefore,
x?
(
m(ν)
)m(ν) = {m(ν)1 if ν ∈ [0, 1/4] ∪ [3/4, 1],
m
(ν)
2 if ν ∈ [1/4, 3/4].
But for ν ∈ [1/4, 3/4], we have the component-wise inequality
m
(ν)
2 =
[
5− 5ν
5ν
]
6
[
4− ν
3 + ν
]
= m
(ν)
1 ,
which entails that for all ν ∈ [0, 1], again component-wise, x?(m(ν))m(ν) 6 m(ν)1 . Substi-
tuting in (10) and using that the supremum distance to the negative orthant is increasing
with respect to component-wise inequalities, i.e.,
(v, w) ∈ R2 7−→ d∞
(
(v, w), (−∞, 0]2) = max{(v)+, (w)+} ,
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we get that
ϕx
?(
m(ν)
)
= sup
{
d∞
(
N∑
i=1
λi x
?
(
m(νi)
)m(νi), (−∞, 0]2) : N > 1 and N∑
i=1
λiνi = ν
}
6 sup
{
d∞
(
N∑
i=1
λim
(νi)
1 , (−∞, 0]2
)
: N > 1 and
N∑
i=1
λiνi = ν
}
= d∞
(
m
(ν)
1 , (−∞, 0]2
)
= ϕ1
(
m(ν)
)
.
The converse inequality ϕx
? > ϕ1 follows from the decomposition of any ν ∈ [0, 1] as the
convex combination of 1, with weight λ1 = ν, and 0, with weight λ2 = 1− ν. In particular,
ϕx
?(
m(ν)
)
> d∞
(
ν x?
(
m(1)
)m(1) + (1− ν)x?(m(0))m(0), (−∞, 0]2)
= d∞
(
m
(ν)
1 , (−∞, 0]2
)
= ϕ1
(
m(ν)
)
,
as both x?
(
m(0)
)
= x?
(
m(1)
)
= (1, 0) as indicated above.
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Appendix C. Other technical proofs
C.1. Proof of two facts related to Definition 5
The comments after Definition 5 mentioned two facts, that we now prove. First, that
condition (8) is less restrictive in general than (7). Second, that for continuous target
functions ϕ, the two definitions (7) and (8) coincide, i.e., that that (8) entails (7).
Condition (8) is less restrictive in general than (7). Non-continuous target functions
need to be considered to that end. We consider a toy case when A is reduced to one element
(so that the decision-maker has no decision to make and has to play this action), and the
opponent player chooses elements in R, i.e., d = 1, and more precisely, K = [0, 1]. The
target set equals C = {0} and the target function ϕ is defined as
ϕ(m) =
{
0 if m ∈ [0, 1),
1 if m = 1.
Since d = A = 1, we can identify mt and rt. We consider the sequence mt = 1 − 1/t. We
have
(mT , rT ) −→ (1, 1) ∈ Gϕ , since Gϕ =
{
(m, 0) : m ∈ [0, 1)} ∪ ({1} × [−1, 1]) .
On the contrary, for all T , we have Cϕ(mT ) = {0} and therefore,
dp
(
rT , Cϕ(mT )
)
= rT
does not converge to 0 as T →∞ (this sequence converges to 1 actually).
Proof that (8) entails (7) under a continuity assumption. We consider a continuous
function ϕ : K → [0,+∞). To show that (8) entails (7), it suffices to show that there exists
a function f : (0,+∞)→ (0,+∞) with f(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0, such that for all (m, r) ∈ K×Rd,
dp
(
r, Cϕ(m)
)
6 f
(
dp
(
(m, r),Gϕ
))
; (43)
the required uniformities with respect to the strategies of the opponent will be carried over.
To that end, the continuity of ϕ will be exploited through the following two properties.
First, Gϕ is closed. Second, since K is bounded, ϕ is actually uniformly continuous: we
denote by ω : (0,+∞) → (0,+∞) its modulus of continuity in the `p–norm, which is a
non-decreasing function that satisfies ω(ε)→ 0 as ε→ 0.
We denote by (mG , rG) the projection in `p–norm of (m, r) ∈ K×Rd onto the closed set
Gϕ. By definition, rG ∈ Cϕ(mG) and
dp
(
(m, r),Gϕ
)
=
ww(m, r)− (mG , rG)wwp > ‖m−mG‖p . (44)
We also define an element r′G ∈ Cϕ(m) as follows. If rG ∈ Cϕ(m) then we let r′G = rG .
Otherwise, ϕ(mG) − ϕ(m) > 0 and as rG ∈ Cϕ(mG), there exists an element r0 ∈ C such
that ‖rG − r0‖p 6 ϕ(mG). (We recall that C is a closed set and its expansions are closed
expansions.) We denote by d the vector
d =
1
ϕ(mG)
(rG − r0) ;
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by construction, ‖d‖p 6 1. We introduce a new point r′G and provide a rewriting of rG :
r′G = r0 + ϕ(m) d ∈ Cϕ(m) and rG = r0 + ϕ(mG) d .
These two equalities yield that
‖rG − r′G‖p =
(
ϕ(mG)− ϕ(m)
) ‖d‖p 6 ϕ(mG)− ϕ(m) .
Summarizing, we have in all cases (whether rG belongs to Cϕ(m) or not)
‖rG − r′G
ww
p
6
∣∣ϕ(mG)− ϕ(m)∣∣ . (45)
Since r′G ∈ Cϕ(m), we get, by a triangle inequality,
dp
(
r, Cϕ(m)
)
6 ‖r − r′G
ww
p
=
ww(m, r)− (m, r′G)wwp
6
ww(m, r)− (mG , rG)wwp +ww(mG , rG)− (m, rG)wwp +ww(m, rG)− (m, r′G)wwp
6 2 dp
(
(m, r),Gϕ
)
+ ‖rG − r′G‖p ,
where the last inequality follows from (44). By (45) and the uniform continuity of ϕ, the
last term in the right-hand side of the display above can be bounded as
‖rG − r′G‖p 6
∣∣ϕ(mG)− ϕ(m)∣∣ 6 ω(‖mG −m‖) 6 ω(dp((m, r),Gϕ)) ,
where for the last inequality, we used again (44) and the fact that ω is non-decreasing.
Putting all pieces together, we proved (43) with f : x 7→ 2x+ ω(x).
C.2. A lemma used in the proof of Theorem 11
Lemma 16 Consider two positive numbers γ1, γ2 and form the positive sequence (un) de-
fined by u1 = γ2 and
un+1 = un + 2γ1
√
(n+ 1)un + γ2(n+ 1)
2
for all n > 1. Then
∀n > 1, un 6 max
{
2γ21 , γ2
}
n3 .
Proof We proceed by induction and note that the relation is satisfied by construction for
n = 1. Assuming now that it holds for some n > 1, we show that it is also true for n + 1.
Denoting C = max
{
2γ21 , γ2
}
, we get
un+1 = un + 2γ1
√
(n+ 1)un + γ2(n+ 1)
2 6 C n3 + 2γ1
√
C
√
(n+ 1)n3 + γ2(n+ 1)
2 .
It suffices to show that the latter upper bound is smaller than C (n + 1)3, which follows
from
2γ1
√
C
√
(n+ 1)n3 + γ2(n+ 1)
2 6
(
2γ1
√
2C + γ2
)
n2 + 2γ2 n+ γ2 6 3C n2 + 3C n+ C ;
indeed, the first inequality comes from bounding (n+1)n3 by 2n4 and expanding the (n+1)2
term, while the second inequality holds because C > γ2 and 2C > 2γ1
√
2C by definition
of C.
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Appendix D. Some thoughts on the optimality of target functions
We first define a notion of optimality, based on the classical theory of mathematical or-
derings, with ≺ (see Definition 6) being seen as a strict partial order, with associated
non-strict partial order denoted by 4 (corresponding to the standard pointwise inequality
6 for functions).
D.1. On the existence of admissible target functions
Definition 17 A target function ϕ is admissible if it is achievable and if there exists no
other achievable target function ϕ′ such that ϕ′ ≺ ϕ.
There might exist several, even an infinite number of, admissible target functions, as
we will show below for Example 1. But there exists always at least one such admissible
function, as we show below in a non-constructive way. We unfortunately were unable to
exhibit general, concrete and closed-form admissible target functions.
Lemma 18 In any unknown game there exists at least one admissible mapping.
Proof The proof is based on an application of Zorn’s lemma. We prove below that the set
T of all achievable target functions ϕ : K → [0,+∞), which is partially ordered for 4, has
the property that every totally ordered subset TΘ = {ϕθ, θ ∈ Θ} has a lower bound in T .
In that case, Zorn’s lemma ensures that the set T contains at least one minimal element:
an element ϕ such that no other element ϕ ∈ T satisfies ϕ ≺ ϕ.
Given a totally ordered subset TΘ, we can define the target function
ϕΘ : m ∈ K 7−→ inf
θ∈Θ
ϕθ(m) ;
ϕΘ is of course smaller than any element of TΘ. The point is to show that ϕΘ ∈ T , i.e.,
that ϕΘ is still achievable.
A property that we will use repeatedly below is that if two target functions are such
that ϕ 4 φ, then Gϕ ⊆ Gφ.
Now, by definition, the fact that the ϕθ are achievable means that the compact sets
Gϕθ are each approachable for the game with payoffs (x,m) ∈ ∆(A)×K 7→ (m, xm); in
particular, they are non empty. The compact set
GϕΘ =
⋂
θ∈Θ
Gϕθ
cannot be empty. Indeed, if it were, fixing any θ′ ∈ Θ, we would have that the subsets
Gϕθ′ \ Gϕθ cover the compact topological space Gϕθ′ . As these subsets are open sets in the
topological space Gϕθ′ , only finitely many of them would be needed for the covering, call
them Gϕθ′ \Gϕj , with j = 1, . . . , N . Since TΘ is totally ordered, one of the sets Gϕj is minimal
for inclusion ⊆, and therefore, one of the sets Gϕθ′ \ Gϕj is maximal for the inclusion ⊆,
say, the one corresponding to j = 1. Therefore, we would have Gϕθ′ \ Gϕ1 = Gϕθ′ . As TΘ is
totally ordered, we would either have ϕ1 4 ϕθ′ and Gϕ1 ⊆ Gϕθ′ , or ϕθ′ 4 ϕ1 and Gϕθ′ ⊆ Gϕ1 .
This would lead to Gϕ1 = ∅ in the former case, and Gϕθ′ = ∅ in the latter case: in both
cases, to a contradiction.
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In addition, we now prove that for all ε > 0, there exists θε ∈ Θ such that Gϕθε is
included in the open ε–expansion of GϕΘ , which we denote by GϕΘ,ε. Indeed, denote by Hϕθ
the compact sets Hϕθ = Gϕθ \ GϕΘ,ε. We have that
HϕΘ =
⋂
θ∈Θ
Hϕθ = GϕΘ \ GϕΘ,ε = ∅ .
Therefore, by the same argument as above, we see that there must exist some θε such that
Hϕθε = ∅, which is exactly what we wanted to prove.
So, summarizing, we proved that GϕΘ is non empty and that each of its ε–open expan-
sion is approachable (as it contains an approachable set). As in the proof of Lemma 10,
this means that GϕΘ is a 0–approachable set, thus an approachable set, or put differently,
that ϕΘ is achievable.
D.2. Illustration on Examples 1 and 2
Which response function Ψ should we choose in practice? And are target functions ϕΨ
always admissible? A convenient and natural choice in practice is Ψ = x?, but Example 2
shows that unfortunately, ϕx
?
is not always admissible. Example 1 shows that many differ-
ent target functions ϕΨ may be admissible. It is thus difficult to issue any general theory
on how to choose Ψ and even on the optimality of the class of target functions ϕΨ.
Example 2: unfortunately, ϕx
?
is not admissible. Indeed, we have ϕ1/2 ≺ ϕx? , as
can be seen by carefully comparing the closed-form expressions (41) and (42). On the other
hand, ϕ1/2 is achievable: it suffices to play xt = (1/2, 1/2) at each round. Actually, ϕ1/2 is
of the form ϕΨ for the constant response function Ψ ≡ (1/2, 1/2).
Example 1: all the target functions associated with the Ψx ≡ (x, 1 − x) are
admissible. We illustrate the general existence result of Lemma 18 by showing that in
Example 1 the target functions ϕx = ϕ
Ψx associated with the constant response functions
Ψx ≡ (x, 1 − x) are admissible, for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This corresponds to the case when the
decision-maker chooses the mixed action (x, 1−x) at all rounds. In particular, the proof of
Lemma 8 indicates that ϕ1 = ϕ
x? , the latter is thus admissible unlike in Example 2.
Closed-form expressions of these target functions ϕx will be needed. For ν ∈ [0, 1], when
the decision-maker plays (x, 1 − x) while the vector of vector payoffs is m(ν), she gets an
average payoff which we denote by r
(
(x, 1− x), m(ν)) and which equals
r
(
(x, 1− x), m(ν)) = x(ν m†1 + (1− ν)m]1)+ (1− x)(ν m†2 + (1− ν)m]2)
= x
(
ν
[
3
4
]
+ (1− ν)
[
4
3
])
+ (1− x)
(
ν
[
0
5
]
+ (1− ν)
[
5
0
])
=
[
x(4− ν) + 5(1− x)(1− ν)
x(3 + ν) + 5(1− x)ν
]
=
[
5− x− ν(5− 4x)
3x+ ν(5− 4x)
]
.
The underlying response function Ψx being constant, no convex decomposition needs to be
considered in the defining supremum for ϕx
(
m(ν)
)
and the latter equals
ϕx
(
m(ν)
)
= d∞
(
r
(
(x, 1−x), m(ν)), (−∞, 0]2) = max{5−x− ν(5− 4x), 3x+ ν(5− 4x)} .
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Since ν 7→ 5− x− ν(5− 4x) is decreasing, and ν 7→ 3x+ ν(5− 4x) is increasing, and both
functions take the same value 5/2− x/2 at ν = 1/2, we get
ϕx
(
m(ν)
)
=
{
5− x− ν(5− 4x) if ν ∈ [0, 1/2],
3x+ ν(5− 4x) if ν ∈ [1/2, 1].
Our proof follows the methodology used to prove Lemma 3. We fix any strategy of the
decision-maker achieving a target function ϕ 6 ϕx, for some fixed x ∈ [0, 1], and we show
that necessarily, ϕ = ϕx. We provide a detailed proof of the equality only for m
(ν) where ν
lies in the interval (3/4, 1]; but this proof can be adapted in a straightforward manner to
prove the equality as well the intervals [0, 1/4], [1/4, 1/2] and [1/2, 3/4]. As in the proof
of Lemma 3, it suffices to consider the almost sure statement of convergence as in (3); the
uniformity with respect to strategies of the opponent is not needed. All statements below
hold almost surely and the times T and T ′ should be thought of as random variables.
Our argument for ν ∈ [3/4, 1] is based on three sequences of mixed actions. For the
first one, assume that the opponent chooses m† (corresponding to ν = 1) during T stages,
where T can be made arbitrarily large. We denote by (vT , 1− vT ) the average of the mixed
actions (xt, 1 − xt) played by the decision-maker during these rounds. The average payoff
vector received equals [
3vT
5− vT
]
,
whose distance to the negative orthant is 5 − vT . Since ϕx(m†) = 5 − x and the strategy
achieves ϕ(m†), where by assumption ϕ(m†) 6 ϕx(m†), it holds that lim sup 5− vT 6 5−x
as T → ∞. For the sake of compactness, we will denote this fact by 5− vT . 5 − x. This
entails that lim inf vT > x as T →∞, a fact that we denote by vT & x.
During the next T stages, we assume that the opponent chooses m] (which corresponds
to ν = 0) and denote by (wT , 1 − wT ) the average of the mixed actions (xt, 1 − xt) played
by the decision-maker during these rounds. The average payoff vectors received between
rounds T + 1 to 2T , on the one hand, and during rounds 1 to 2T , on the other hand, are
therefore respectively equal to[
5− wT
3wT
]
and
1
2
[
3vT + 5− wT
5− vT + 3wT
]
,
so that the distance of the latter to the negative orthant is given by
1
2
max
{
3vT + 5− wT , 5− vT + 3wT
}
,
which we know is asymptotically smaller than ϕ
(
m(1/2)
)
by achievability of ϕ, where by
assumption
ϕ
(
m(1/2)
)
6 ϕx
(
m(1/2)
)
= 5/2 + x .
We thus obtained the following system of equations:
vT & x,
3vT − wT . 2x,
−vT + 3wT . 2x.
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The sum of the last two inequalities is vT + wT . 2x. Together with the first inequality
vT & x, it leads to wT . x. Substituting in the second inequality, we get 3vT − wT ≈ 2x,
where the ≈ symbol denotes a convergence: 3vT−wT → 2x as T →∞. Summing the proved
limits −9vT + 3wT ≈ −6x and 8vT & 8x yields −vT + 3wT & 2x, thus −vT + 3wT ≈ 2x.
From the latter limit and 3vT − wT ≈ 2x, we finally get vT ≈ x and wT ≈ x.
Consider now some ν > 3/4. We show that ϕ(ν) > ϕx(ν). To that end, assume that
after the T stages of m† the opponent switches instead to m(3/4) = (3/4)m† + (1/4)m]
during
T ′ =
1− ν
ν − 3/4T
rounds. Note that in this case, the average values of the coefficients for m† and m] used in
the first T + T ′ rounds are proportional to
1 +
3
4
1− ν
ν − 3/4 =
ν
4ν − 3 and 0 +
1
4
1− ν
ν − 3/4 =
1− ν
4ν − 3 (46)
that is, mT+T ′ = m
(ν) = ν m† + (1 − ν)m] was played. We perform first some auxiliary
calculations: by multiplying the equalities in (46) by T , we see that the total number T +T ′
of rounds equals T + T ′ = T/(4ν − 3). In particular, we have
T/(T + T ′) = 4ν − 3 and T ′/(T + T ′) = 1− (4ν − 3) = 4− 4ν .
Finally, denoting by uT ′ the average mixed action played by the decision-maker in rounds
T + 1 to T +T ′, we have that the average vector payoffs during rounds T + 1 to T +T ′ and
during rounds 1 to T + T ′ are respectively equal to
r
(
(uT ′ , 1− uT ′), 3/4
)
=
[
5− uT ′ − (3/4)(5− 4uT ′)
3uT ′ + (3/4)(5− 4uT ′)
]
=
[
2uT ′ + 5/4
15/4
]
and
T
T + T ′
[
3vT
5− vT
]
+
T ′
T + T ′
[
2uT ′ + 5/4
15/4
]
= (4ν−3)
[
3vT
5− vT
]
+(4−4ν)
[
2uT ′ + 5/4
15/4
]
.
(47)
The overall average payoff is given by the distance of this vector in the supremum norm to
the negative orthant and must be smaller than ϕ
(
m(ν)
)
in the limit, by achievability of ϕ.
However, the said distance of (47) to the negative orthant is bound to be larger than the
second component of (47), which equals
(4ν−3)(5−vT )+(4−4ν)15
4
−→ (4ν−3)(5−x)+(4−4ν)15
4
= 5ν+3x−4νx = ϕx
(
m(ν)
)
,
as T →∞, where we substituted the above limit vT → x.
We thus proved ϕ
(
m(ν)
)
> ϕx
(
m(ν)
)
, as claimed.
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